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Lewis A. Grossman
This Article explores how AIDS activists, desperate for access to potentially
life-saving pharmaceuticals, permanently transformed America’s “drug
constitution.” Their advocacy altered the FDA’s interpretation and application of
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) so as to expedite the
availability of new, unproven drugs for critical illnesses, thus enhancing
individual patients’ autonomy to make therapeutic choices without government
interference.
The FDCA is more than simple set of instructions to a federal agency—it is a
source of vitally important and deeply entrenched institutional and normative
frameworks. Like major civil rights, antitrust, and environmental statutes, the
FDCA should be viewed as a quasi-constitutional “superstatute.” Therefore, the
AIDS activists’ FDA reform campaign of the late 1980s and early 1990s should be
understood as a “constitutional” movement, even though it rarely invoked the
United States Constitution and pursued its goals entirely outside of court. As a
result of the AIDS movement’s efforts, federal drug regulation today reflects not
only the FDCA’s original foundational principle of protecting consumers from
hazardous protects, but also the (often contrary) fundamental goal of promoting
the expeditious release of potentially effective treatments for severe illnesses. The
AIDS activists’ successful advocacy regarding drug access permanently shifted
decision-making power previously exercised by the FDA to individual patients
and their physicians.
In addition to linking the AIDS movement to other major civil rights
campaigns focused on the implementation of statutes, this Article details a
particularly remarkable advocacy effort that has gone mostly overlooked in the
legal literature. The Article examines how a movement composed largely of
members of a scorned and marginalized population—HIV-positive gay men—
significantly altered a crucial body of law administered by one of the country’s
most powerful agencies. As the Article describes, the AIDS movement achieved
this success in a seemingly incongruous alliance with conservative libertarians.
Rather than simply telling a triumphal story, however, this Article explores how
the AIDS movement was ultimately torn apart by deep schisms that prevented it
from ever coalescing around a fully coherent medical libertarian philosophy. The
most profound of these divisions, rooted in the very nature of controlled clinical
research, concerned the moral acceptability of limiting terminally ill people’s
freedom to try experimental drugs so as to ensure the production of reliable data
regarding the treatments’ effectiveness. Ambivalence about the proper resolution
of this quandary—among activists and society as a whole—has inhibited a radical
dissolution of the FDA’s gatekeeping power. Nevertheless, as this Article
concludes, federal regulation of medical products is now very different than it
would have been without the AIDS activists’ determined efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
The Parklawn Building, a massive, bland edifice erected in the late
1960s, looms over a neighborhood of nondescript office buildings and auto
repair shops in Rockville, Maryland, about four miles outside the
Washington, D.C. Beltway. Until recently, the building contained the
headquarters of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as
other Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) offices. It is an
unlikely setting for a mass protest. For a thousand boisterous AIDS activists
who stormed it on October 12, 1988, however, the Parklawn Building was
the Bastille. And as this Article will explain, their demonstration sparked a
profound transformation in the government’s approach to regulating
treatments for serious illnesses.
The “Seize Control of FDA” protesters—many of them bused in by the
recently formed AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP)—demanded
that the agency speed the availability of drugs for Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome. Since it had emerged in the United States in 1981,
AIDS had spread with particular virulence among gay and bisexual men. 1
1

CDC FACT SHEET: ESTIMATES OF HIV INFECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2 (2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/fact-sheet-on-hiv-estimates.pdf.
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They dominated the crowd surrounding the Parklawn Building, although
many women joined the protest, too. For an entire workday, the
demonstrators loudly condemned the federal government’s inaction in the
face of AIDS. They denounced the apathy of President Ronald Reagan and
Vice-President George H. W. Bush (the 1988 Republican nominee). Their
primary target, however, was the FDA itself.
In truth, the FDA had not been completely inert in response to the
horrific rise of the epidemic. In 1986, the agency had made azidothymidine
(AZT)—an investigational antiretroviral drug that targeted the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV)—available to patients outside of formal
clinical trials on a “compassionate use” basis. The following year, it had
approved AZT’s New Drug Application (NDA) with extraordinary speed.
In addition, the FDA had issued a “treatment IND” rule in 1987,
formalizing its longstanding ad hoc practice of allowing therapeutic use of
investigational new drugs in desperate situations. 2
AIDS activists were nonetheless enraged in the fall of 1988. AZT
remained the only FDA-approved therapy for HIV/AIDS. At best, this drug
delayed the disease’s inevitably fatal outcome, and many people with AIDS
(PWAs) could not tolerate its severe side effects. In October 1987, an FDA
advisory committee had recommended against the approval of ganciclovir,
a promising drug for a blindness-inducing eye infection common among
PWAs. Meanwhile, the treatment IND process was not significantly
increasing access to AIDS drugs still under investigation. At the time of the
Parklawn protest, the FDA had made only one AIDS-related experimental
therapy available pursuant to the new procedure—trimetrexate, a medicine
for an often fatal form of pneumonia acquired by many PWAs. 3
American scientists were studying scores of other compounds, and
many in the HIV-positive population were eager to try each one as soon as
it showed the slightest evidence of efficacy, rather than wait the seven to ten
years the FDA ordinarily took to approve a drug. 4 Accompanied by whistles
and noisemakers, the crowd around the Parklawn Building chanted its
2

See infra p. [ ].
In July 1988, FDA had approved one out of four treatment IND requests for AIDSrelated drugs and four out of eight for other drugs. Philip M. Boffey, New Initiative to
Speed AIDS Drugs is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1988, at C1.
4
The details of the demonstration related below are drawn from various sources,
including video footage of the event collated by SuchIsLife Videos,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s70aCOflRgY; the documentary How to Survive a
Plague; interviews in the AUOHP, http://www.actuporalhistory.org/interviews/; Paul
Duggan, 1,000 Swarm FDA’s Rockville Office to Demand Approval of AIDS Drugs,
WASHINGTON POST, October 12, 1988, at 1; 176 Arrested at FDA AIDS Drug Protest,
Many Employees Don’t Go to Work, HEALTH DAILY, October 12, 1988, at 2–4; FDA
Resumes Business After AIDS Demonstration, HEALTH DAILY, October 17, 1988, at 7.
3
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demands for pharmaceutical access. “AZT is not enough, give us all the
other stuff!” “Release the drugs now!” Most provocatively, the
demonstrators, referring to the FDA Commissioner, yelled “Frank Young,
you can’t hide, we charge you with genocide!” Their placards and banners
were no gentler. “AIDS Doesn’t Discriminate—Our Government Does.”
“Federal Death Administration.” Many signs displayed a pink triangle,
evoking the patch sewn onto the uniforms of gay inmates in Nazi
concentration camps.
The action’s theatrical elements captured the attention of cameramen
from the television networks and major newspapers. Protestors lay down on
the street holding cardboard tombstones bearing epitaphs such as “RIP,
Killed by FDA” and “I Died for the Sins of FDA.” Others paraded around
in “blood”-stained white doctors’ coats. ACT UP’s Peter Staley, a J. P.
Morgan bond trader turned full-time activist, hoisted himself onto the
portico over the building’s main entrance, wearing a bandana that made him
look, in the eyes of a fellow protestor, like the Karate Kid. 5 Once there, he
attached a giant “Silence=Death” sign on the façade and set off smoke
bombs, to the cheers of the throng.
The event was peaceful overall. A glass door and a couple of windows
were shattered. Six activists snuck inside the building and briefly occupied
some non-FDA offices. One protester was arrested after knocking a police
officer off his motorcycle. Other demonstrators, some in T-shirts declaring
“Gay and Positive,” occupied the driveway in front of the building and
refused to move. Eventually, police—some wearing latex gloves—escorted
or dragged 175 handcuffed activists to buses, which carted them off to be
booked for loitering. Despite the gravity of the cause, the event was
characterized by inspired camp and an almost festive camaraderie. As the
buses rolled away to transport the arrestees to the police station, the
passengers crooned the theme song from television’s Carol Burnett Show:
“I’m so glad we had this time together.” 6 One activist recalled, “It was
really fun. I mean, it was really fun.” 7
The day of the protest was not a productive one inside the Parklawn
Building. Many employees stayed home or failed to breach the blockade.
Those who managed to reach their desks spent hours peering through
windows at the commotion outside.
When the workforce arrived en masse the next morning, things seemed
back to normal. But in fact, the FDA never really resumed business as usual
5

Michael Nesline interview, Mar. 24, 2003, at 43 (interview # 014 of the ACT UP
Oral History Project (hereinafter AUOHP), available at http://www.actuporalhistory.org/).
6
Jay Blotcher interview, Apr. 24, 2004, at 54 (interview # 054 of the ACT UP Oral
History Project).
7
Nesline interview, supra note [ ], at 43.
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after ACT UP seized the agency in October 1988. This Article will examine
how the AIDS social movement spurred changes in the agency’s
implementation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and,
eventually, in the language of the statute itself. The resulting reforms have
made access to potentially life-saving drugs a fundamental goal of the Act,
alongside the protection of consumers from unsafe and ineffective
products. 8
In describing and analyzing the AIDS activists’ impact on FDA drug
regulation, this Article draws on a number prominent contemporary
developments in legal scholarship. One scholarly trend, articulated most
prominently by William N. Eskridge and John Ferejohn, focuses on how
this country’s foundational legal principles are contained not only in the
United States Constitution, but also in quasi-constitutional “superstatutes”
and their implementation by administrative agencies. 9 The FDCA, enacted
in 1938 as the successor to the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, is one
such statute. 10 Congress passed the FDCA largely in response to a crisis
precipitated by insufficient government protection of drug consumers—
namely, the death of more than a hundred people who consumed a medicine
called Elixir Sulfanilamide. 11 The statute was premised on the principle that
the national government should shield consumers from unsafe and (in the
case of medical products) ineffective goods, including food, drugs,
cosmetics, and medical devices. 12 Later amendments, in 1962 and 1976,
strengthened the statute by requiring the FDA to block new drugs and some
medical devices from entering the market until the agency was satisfied that
their benefits outweighed their risks. 13 Despite occasional protests, the
8

21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f.
William N. Jr Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE LAW J. 1215
(2001); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 9 (2014) (emphasizing the constitutional character of the
seminal civil rights statutes of the 1960s).
10
Eskridge and Ferejohn identify both the Pure Food and Drugs Act and the FDCA as
“super-statutes.” Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra note 9 at 1226, 1257–58.
11
PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (4th ed. 2014).
12
In 2009, tobacco products were added to this list. 2009 Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776-1858 (2009), codified
primarily at 21 U.S.C. §§ 387-387t.
13
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780-96 (1962); Medical
Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539-83 (1976). In addition, the
Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), and the
Color Additive Amendment of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (1960), established
FDA premarket approval regimes requiring manufacturers to demonstrate safety (but not
effectiveness) prior to sale.
9
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American public has broadly endorsed FDA’s role as the gatekeeper for
medical products. 14
The quasi-constitutional nature of the FDCA is reflected not only in the
important, deeply-entrenched government structures and functions it has
created, but also in its corresponding effect of restricting American
consumers’ choices within some of the most essential product categories in
the human economy. As a formal matter, the Act curbs the conduct of
manufacturers and distributors, not their customers. Nevertheless, when the
FDA prevents the sale of a product altogether, the Agency also indirectly
limits the rights of consumers who want that product. Americans usually
quietly accept this constraint on their freedom of choice because they value
the FDA’s role in safeguarding their health. On occasion, however—and
with increasingly frequency since the 1970s—citizens have resisted FDA
restrictions on the sale of certain drugs as unwarranted infringements on
their autonomy. As we will see, these protests have been especially fervent
with respect to potentially life-saving medications, as patients have
condemned government curbs on the distribution of such products as
violations of the most fundamental right of all—the right to attempt to
preserve one’s own life.
The AIDS activists’ struggle to loosen the FDA’s gatekeeping role with
respect to drugs can thus be viewed as a form of constitutional struggle,
even though they rarely invoked the language of the U.S. Constitution itself.
By forcing a change in the FDA’s regulatory practices, the campaign
effectively amended the country’s “drug constitution”—a term I use in this
Article to refer to the human drug provisions of the FDCA and the agency’s
interpretation and application of them. Before the AIDS movement took to
the streets, the FDA viewed the sole core purpose of the FDCA as guarding
the public health by protecting consumers from hazardous and ineffective
products. By the time AIDS activism waned in the early 1990s, the Act—as
interpreted and applied by the agency—also embodied the (sometimes
contrary) fundamental purpose of promoting the expeditious release of
potentially effective treatments, both to advance public health and to
enhance consumer choice. Before the turn of the century, Congress would
embody this transformation in the language of the FDCA itself. 15
This Article is also a contribution to the growing body of scholarship,
dubbed “demosprudence” by Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, that focuses
on the “dynamic equilibrium of power between law and social

14

See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (1st ed. 2010).
15
See infra [ ].
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movements.” 16 Work in this vein considers how citizen mobilizations create
the conditions for durable legal change, including by opening space for
marginalized minorities to participate in policy formation. 17 This approach
is becoming an important component of constitutional law scholarship in
particular. While some of this work focuses on the influence social
movements have on the judicial interpretation and application of the U.S.
Constitution itself (what Eskridge and Ferejohn call “large ‘C’
Constitutionalism”), 18 an important more recent strain emphasizes their
impact on the language and post-enactment implementation of quasiconstitutional superstatutes (“small ‘c’ constitutionalism”). This Article is a
contribution to this latter body of work, which examines how constitutional
values are forged by interactions between social movements and nonjudicial
government officials, such as agency administrators and legislators.
The story of the AIDS activists’ struggle to reform FDA drug
regulation thus demonstrates how extralegal popular mobilization can play
an important constitutive function in the administrative law sphere. This
Article is not the first work of legal scholarship to emphasize the
importance of interactions between social movements and administrative
agencies in shaping the nation’s core values. 19 Such studies are a small but
growing component of the growing body of work about “administrative
16

Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE LAW J. 2740–2804, 2749
(2014); For other examples of the growing literature on the interaction between social
movements and law, see Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing in the Shadow of the Law:
Lesbian and Gay Rights in the Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 RES. SOC. MOV.
CONFL. CHANGE 175–205 (2010); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and
the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1436 (2005); Susan D.
Carle, Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, A, 63 FLA. LAW
REV. 251 (2011); Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment, 73
FORDHAM LAW REV. 549 (2004); William N. Jr Eskridge, Channeling: Identity-Based
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 UNIV. PA. LAW REV. 419 (2001); Michael
McCann, Law and Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND
SOCIETY 506–522 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Edward L. Rubin, Passing through the Door:
Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 UNIV. PA. LAW REV. 1 (2001);
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA - 2005-06 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 94
CALIF. LAW REV. 1323 (2006).
17
Guinier and Torres, supra note 16 at 2749–56.
18
ESKRIDGE AND FEREJOHN, supra note 9 at 3; For an example of this type of
scholarship, see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social
Movements, 154 UNIV. PA. LAW REV. 950 (2005).
19
See, e.g. Eskridge, supra note 16; ESKRIDGE AND FEREJOHN, supra note 9; Gillian
E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. LAW REV. 1897–1936 (2013); Vicki
Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENVER UNIV. LAW REV. 995–1119
(2015).
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constitutionalism.” 20 Nevertheless, legal academics have produced few
detailed analyses, from the ground-up, of the tactics particular social
movements have used to shape particular agencies’ policies. 21 This Article
adds to the literature by providing such an examination. The AIDS
movement’s FDA campaign offers a particularly interesting example of a
social movement’s administrative reform effort, for the notice-andcomment rulemaking procedure established by the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) was far less crucial to it than other, non-APA
techniques, such as street protests, media appearances, private meetings
with agency officials, and testimony at public hearings.
This Article also offers insight into the distinct dynamic of social
movement campaigns focusing on scientific agencies that deal with highly
technical issues. In contrast to agencies like the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission (recently examined from a social movement
perspective by Vicki Schultz), the FDA bases its decisions largely on hard
scientific data. Although some legal scholars have discussed social
movements’ efforts to reform the practices of scientific agencies,
particularly in the environmental area, 22 close studies of the particular
challenges confronting such efforts appear primarily in the social science
literature. 23 As I explore below, the scientific nature of the FDA’s mission
shaped the AIDS movement’s activism, requiring the development of a
cadre of technically sophisticated “treatment activists” who forged
productive working relationships with government officials and scientists.
This development in turn produced irresolvable tensions within the
movement itself, and a bitter split ultimately occurred between these
“insider” treatment activists and their less scientifically literate, more
radical “outsider” counterparts.
Finally, this Article highlights two distinctive aspects of patient
activism concerning the regulation of medical products. One distinguishing
feature is the especially fraught intra-movement divisions rooted in the very
20

See generally Metzger, supra note 19.
See, e.g., Ruth Landridge, When Do Challengers Succeed--Nongovernmental
Actors, Administrative Agencies, and Legal Change: Shifting Rules for Oregon’s Private
Forests, 36 LAW SOC. INQ. 662 (2011); Schultz, supra note 19.
22
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The
Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 UNIV. PA. LAW REV. 118 (2001);
Landridge, supra note 21.
23
See, e.g., STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS
OF KNOWLEDGE (1996); Steven Epstein, The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism
and the Forging of Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials, 20 SCI. TECHNOL. HUM.
VALUES 408–437 (1995); David J. Hess, Medical Modernisation, Scientific Research
Fields and the Epistemic Politics of Health Social Movements, 26 SOCIOL. HEALTH ILLN.
695–709 (2004).
21
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nature of medical research. 24 Modern clinical science depends primarily on
the double-blind controlled investigation—a methodology that treats ill
people as randomly-assigned subjects of study rather than as autonomous
patients. As we will see, AIDS activists were passionately divided on the
morality of restricting patient choice in the interest of obtaining scientific
evidence of efficacy.
This Article also explores an inter-movement phenomenon
characteristic of medical product activism. The ideological dynamics of
body politics can forge remarkable left-right coalitions. In the case of AIDS
drugs, left-leaning champions of gay and women’s liberation who supported
government intervention in many arenas joined forces with right-leaning
libertarians who promoted sweeping deregulation. As we will see, this
alliance of convenience presented the AIDS movement with challenges as
well as opportunities.
This Article will proceed as follows. Section I introduces the special
problems AIDS activists confronted as the first major movement for
freedom of therapeutic choice focused not on alternative cures but on
orthodox medicine. Section II lays out the legal framework for drug
regulation established by the FDCA. It also describes the FDA’s general
approach to implementing this statute prior to the AIDS crisis. Section III
describes how even before the rise of the AIDS movement, conservative
libertarians fought, with limited success, to make unapproved drugs more
available to PWAs and others with deadly diseases.
Section IV discusses the emergence of FDA-focused activism among
PWAs and their allies, culminating in the Parklawn protest. Section V
explores a variety of tactical and ideological questions faced by the AIDS
movement following the FDA demonstration. Section VI considers the
movement’s initial regulatory victory, the publication of “Subpart E”
procedures expediting the development of drugs for serious illnesses, and
Section VII describes its greatest triumph, the creation of a “parallel track”
allowing PWAs to take unapproved drugs for treatment purposes while
clinical trials were still ongoing. Section VIII describes the schism that
subsequently developed, dividing scientifically literate “treatment activists”
from the broader movement. Section IX analyzes the vicious conflict that
occurred between these factions over FDA’s proposed “Accelerated
Approval” procedure, which lowered the evidentiary requirements for initial
marketing of some AIDS drugs. Finally, this Article’s Conclusion considers
the legacy of the AIDS movement’s FDA campaign: the amendment of
America’s “drug constitution” in a way that still shapes medical product
regulation today.
24

Schultz emphasizes the importance of studying intra-movement divisions. Schultz,
supra note 21.
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I. A MOVEMENT FOR FREEDOM OF CHOICE WITHIN ORTHODOX MEDICINE
AIDS activism was not the first social movement to target the FDA; as
I have examined in other work, movements fighting for access to dietary
supplements and Laetrile (an alternative cancer treatment derived from
apricot pits) had done so in the 1970s. 25 Nonetheless, something different
was going on when ACT UP took up its struggle. Unlike their forerunners,
the leading AIDS activists did not reject the scientific premises of modern
drug development. To the contrary, they focused their demands on cuttingedge pharmaceutical treatments produced by the government-industrialacademic biomedical complex. AIDS activism was the first mass movement
for freedom of therapeutic choice within orthodox scientific medicine.
The AIDS movement thus invited a fundamental tension into its
ideology—a tension that, more than anything else, distinguished it from
prior campaigns for freedom of therapeutic choice. As I have described
elsewhere, American opponents of government restrictions on alternative
therapies have long stressed the value of unfettered experimentation by
practitioners and patients. They have considered free inquiry to be essential
to both effective individual treatment and to the advancement of medical
knowledge. 26
By contrast, in the worldview of modern scientific medicine, a
treatment’s efficacy is determined not by decentralized trial-and-error
experimentation, but by meticulously designed, FDA-regulated, controlled
clinical studies. Indeed, those who embrace the modern clinical research
model believe that the unrestricted use of experimental drugs actually
undermines the quest for scientific truth by diverting patients away from
such controlled studies. The AIDS activists thus pinned their medical hopes
on a system in which the advancement of knowledge requires not free
inquiry, but rather highly regulated inquiry. As we will see, this tension
between access and knowledge bedeviled the AIDS movement’s campaign
to reform FDA drug regulation and, ultimately, prevented it from ever
coalescing around a unified, comprehensive medical libertarian ideology.
25

Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L.
REV. 627–677, 646–51, 666–68 (2014); Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the
Empowered Patient, in FDA IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn
Cohen eds., 2015).
26
Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13 YALE J.
HEALTH POLICY LAW ETHICS 76–134, 118–20 (2013); Lewis A. Grossman, Orthodoxy and
“The Other Man’s Doxy”: Medical Licensing and Medical Freedom in the Gilded Age, in
YOU CAN CHOOSE YOUR MEDICINE: FREEDOM OF THERAPEUTIC CHOICE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY AND LAW (forthcoming).
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The fact that AIDS activism was a movement for freedom of
therapeutic choice within orthodox medicine also impelled the AIDS
community to embrace different tactics. Protesters against government
curbs on alternative medicine have generally approached their tasks as
outsiders. They have stood apart from, and resisted the authority of,
establishment institutions and orthodox systems of knowledge. AIDS
activists sometimes adopted an “outsider” approach, particularly when they
engaged in disruptive direct actions, not only at the FDA, but also, for
example, at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), St. Patrick’s Cathedral,
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Medical Association
headquarters, and North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms’s house (which they
sheathed in a giant condom). Such demonstrations called attention to
PWAs’ plight, challenged the homophobic values of the dominant culture,
and satisfied the expressive and identity-building needs of the AIDS
community itself.
But leading AIDS activists recognized that street protests alone could
not achieve their more instrumental goal of reforming the FDA’s approach
to drug regulation. That mission, they concluded, required members of their
movement to enter the halls of power and, using the technical language of
modern scientific medicine, interact directly with the government, the
pharmaceutical industry, and the clinical research community.
Consequently, an organized group of “treatment activists” emerged within
ACT UP to lead the FDA reform effort. This determined coterie of eloquent
laymen mastered the science of AIDS and the complexities of
pharmaceutical research. Due to their emergence, the AIDS movement did
not, like most social movements focused on science or medicine, simply
attack the trustworthiness of “experts” or embrace an anti-scientific
epistemology. Instead, as contemporaneously described by sociologist
Steven Epstein:
These activists wrangle with scientists on issues of truth and method.
They seek not only to reform science by exerting pressure from the outside but
also to perform science by locating themselves on the inside.… Most
fundamentally, they claim to speak credibly as experts in their own right—as
people who know about things scientific and who can partake of this special
and powerful discourse of truth. 27

In both formal proceedings and informal meetings, this cluster of
autodidacts engaged in highly technical discussions with the FDA and other
stakeholders about how best to tackle the AIDS crisis. This “inside”
complement to outside action was perhaps the defining characteristic of
AIDS activism and subsequent movements for freedom within orthodox
27

EPSTEIN, supra note 23 at 13.
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medicine. 28 As we will see, however, it also represented a widening schism
that ultimately tore the AIDS movement apart.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF FDA DRUG REGULATION
Although the FDA arguably lacked sensitivity, creativity, and a
sufficient sense of urgency in its early response to AIDS, nobody could
charge it with violating the law by severely restricting access to drugs not
yet definitively shown to be safe and effective. To the contrary, the agency
was following the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA to the letter. Unfortunately for PWAs clamoring for an opportunity
to try new medications, that statute’s primary goal was to keep unsafe and
ineffective drugs off the market.
In 1938, Congress passed the FDCA largely in response to a
catastrophe in more than 100 Americans, many of them children, died as a
result of taking “Elixir Sulfanilamide,” an early antibiotic. Before this time,
the FDA lacked any power to review the safety of drugs prior to sale. The
FDCA created the modern system under which submission of a New Drug
Application (NDA) to the agency must precede the introduction of a new
drug onto the market. Notably, however, the 1938 version of the statute
required NDAs to contain evidence of safety, but not of effectiveness.
Furthermore, the 1938 FDCA created a premarket notification process
rather than a true premarket approval process; an NDA would automatically
“become effective” after 60 days unless the FDA intervened and
affirmatively disapproved it.
The groundbreaking 1962 Drug Amendments were a reaction to
another public health disaster. This time, the source of the problem was
thalidomide, a popular sedative used in many nations around the world.
Soon after pregnant women began to take thalidomide as a treatment for
morning sickness, it became apparent that the drug caused severe birth
defects—most distinctively malformed and stunted limbs. Thanks to the
resoluteness of a now-legendary FDA medical officer named Frances
Kelsey, the agency never allowed thalidomide’s American NDA to become
effective. Congress recognized how narrowly the United States had averted
tragedy, however, and it promptly amended the FDCA to strengthen the
regulation of new drugs—in ways that went far beyond correcting any
deficiencies revealed by the thalidomide crisis. 29
28

Epstein, supra note 23.
Accounts of the thalidomide crisis and Kelsey’s role in it appear in id. at 228–97
and MORTON MINTZ, BY PRESCRIPTION ONLY: A REPORT ON THE ROLES OF THE UNITED
STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, AND OTHERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE IRRATIONAL
29

13

America’s Drug Constitution

The main features of the regulatory framework established by the 1962
Drug Amendments remain intact today. The Amendments introduced the
requirement that investigators notify the FDA prior to commencing any
study of an unapproved drug in human beings. Moreover, Congress
authorized the agency to disallow or halt any investigation that did not
satisfy requirements set forth in FDA regulations, including human subject
protections. 30 The FDA issued these “Investigational New Drug” (IND)
regulations in 1963. 31 One section of this rule established the enduring
three-phase structure for human drug experiments familiar to researchers
today. 32 Phase 1 studies are performed in a small number of (usually
healthy) volunteers and are designed primarily to assess the drug’s safety at
increasing doses. Phase 2 studies are conducted in a larger but limited
number of subjects suffering from the target disease and are performed with
the goal of assessing the treatment’s effectiveness as well as safety. Phase 3
studies are large trials intended to gather all the information the FDA needs
to perform an overall risk-benefit assessment of the drug and to review the
proposed physician labeling. 33
The 1962 Amendments also made important changes to the FDA drug
approval process. They converted the NDA procedure into a true premarket
approval scheme, under which a manufacturer cannot legally market a new
drug until the FDA has positively approved it. 34 More importantly, the 1962
Amendments revised the Act to require the agency to reject an NDA, not
only if the applicant fails to demonstrate that the drug is safe, but also if
“there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports … to have … in the proposed labeling.” 35
Although the 1962 Amendments listed proof of safety and proof of
effectiveness as separate requirements, the FDA immediately recognized
the inextricable relationship between them and embraced a drug approval
calculus that weighs benefit against risk. 36 This interpretation of the statute
AND MASSIVE USE OF PRESCRIPTION
EVEN LETHAL 248–64 (1967).

DRUGS THAT MAY BE WORTHLESS, INJURIOUS, OR
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was sensible and probably inevitable. Many useful pharmaceutical products
(including most AIDS and cancer drugs) pose significant risks. If FDA
considered the safety of such products in isolation from their benefits, it
would reject many indispensable treatments. But this risk-benefit approach
also exposed the FDA to a new type of challenge to its NDA decisions—
attacks on the agency’s policy judgments rather than (or in addition to) its
scientific findings. After all, a decision by the FDA to reject an effective
drug because of excessive risks is not merely a scientific conclusion.
Rather, it is a determination that the particular product’s risks so clearly
outweigh its benefits that the government should deny patients and their
physicians the opportunity to perform their own risk-benefit assessment and
make their own treatment decision. The AIDS activists were among the first
to attack FDA rulings on this basis.
Another critical feature of the 1962 Amendments was their definition
of “substantial evidence” of effectiveness: “evidence consisting of adequate
and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved.” 37 Congress left the precise meaning of
this phrase to FDA regulation. As the AIDS activists would later realize, the
agency’s interpretations and applications of this statutory standard were also
policy judgments subject to challenge, particularly in the context of an
inevitably fatal disease whose victims might not demand the same level of
certainty as people suffering from less serious ailments.
The FDA has always interpreted the plural form of the word
investigations in the definition of “substantial evidence” to signify that a
drug sponsor must ordinarily present at least two adequate and wellcontrolled studies demonstrating efficacy. 38 In practice, the agency almost
always demands that these two studies be phase 3 trials. In construing the
term adequate and well controlled investigations in its regulations
implementing the 1962 Amendments, the agency embraced the
methodology broadly adopted by the field of clinical pharmacology during
the 1950s: the randomized, double-blind, controlled study. 39 The FDA’s
1970 rule on “adequate and well-controlled studies”—as elaborated by
subsequent agency practices and guidance documents—established this type
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of trial as the “gold standard” for demonstrating drug efficacy. 40 The rule
declared: “Isolated case reports, random experience, and reports lacking the
details which permit scientific evaluation will not be considered [in
assessing efficacy].” 41
Consequently, for the past half century, almost all “pivotal” trials
conducted to demonstrate drug efficacy in support of an NDA have shared
certain characteristics. They are “controlled”—that is, they compare,
according to predefined diagnostic criteria, a group of people taking the
experimental drug to one or more distinct “control” groups. Ideally, the
control group takes a placebo, although other types of controls sometimes
suffice, including the “active treatment” controls used when “administration
of a placebo would be contrary to the interest of the patient.” 42 To minimize
bias, the subjects are assigned to the experimental arm or the control arm of
the study on a random basis (“randomization”), and both investigators and
subjects are ignorant with respect to which arm of the study each subject is
in (“double-blinding”). To ensure scientific integrity, drug investigations
are conducted according to detailed, pre-established protocols, and only
people who satisfy strict eligibility criteria are permitted to participate.
Because of the rigorous, multistep drug development and approval
process that Congress and the FDA imposed on manufacturers starting in
1962, many drugs took significantly longer to reach the market in the
United States than in other advanced nations. 43 During the quarter of a
century following 1962, both the time that industry spent researching new
drugs and the time FDA spent reviewing NDAs ballooned. 44 The average
total interval that elapsed between the commencement of clinical research
and final FDA approval grew from a little over four years in 1963 to more
than ten years by 1990. 45 While scholars and policymakers debated the
significance and causes of this “drug lag,” PWAs feared that without a
change in approach, the AIDS treatments they needed would not reach the
market until years after they had perished.
AIDS patients derived some solace from the FDA’s March 1987
approval of AZT. The approval was based on the results of one successful
phase 2 study, a placebo-controlled trial that the agency terminated early
because of its strikingly positive data. Only 22 months passed between the
40
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start of clinical trials and approval of the NDA—a process so fast that one
agency official likened AZT to a “greased pig.” 46 But AZT was not a cure.
Moreover, it was intolerably toxic for many people at the prescribed dose.
PWAs desperately sought access to additional drugs, and they did not want
to wait for FDA approval.
When the AIDS crisis arose, neither the FDCA nor FDA regulations
explicitly allowed any use of unapproved drugs for the treatment of
patients, as opposed to their administration for research purposes. 47
Nonetheless, the agency had for decades sometimes permitted seriously ill
patients with no satisfactory alternatives to obtain experimental drugs for
treatment. It had done so on a largely ad hoc basis, under various rubrics,
including “single patient exceptions” and “compassionate use INDs.”
Moreover, since 1976, the National Cancer Institute, with FDA
acquiescence, had furnished the most promising cancer therapies it was
investigating (“Group C” drugs) to physicians prior to approval for
treatment use. The FDA had also overseen some quite large “open label
IND” programs, in which doctors administered unapproved medications,
primarily cardiovascular drugs, to ill patients and collected safety data. 48
Even before the emergence of AIDS, the FDA thus had significant
flexibility within the terms of the FDCA to expedite the availability of
unapproved drugs. Indeed, the Act as a whole was written in broad terms
that left much to agency discretion. In 1972, FDA Chief Counsel Peter
Barton Hutt famously declared: “the Act must be regarded as a constitution.
It establishes a set of fundamental principles … without attempting to
specify every detail of regulation.” 49
But Hutt himself, at the time, defined that mission as one of protecting
consumers from adulterated and misbranded products, not of promoting the
availability of potentially useful ones. 50 Hutt was hardly alone in viewing
this type of consumer protection as the FDA’s main “constitutional”
function. Around the same time, Milton Katz, after remarking on other
agencies’ missions to “promote” the development and application of
technology, observed that the “mission of the [FDA] is not promotional, but
46
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protective.” 51 In the words of the scholar and former FDA Chief Counsel
Richard Merrill, the FDA long believed that its job was “to prevent harm to
consumers rather than facilitate the introduction of useful new medical
products.” 52 Consequently, preapproval access to drugs and rapid drug
approvals were relatively rare phenomena.
A prominent judicial struggle over the meaning of the country’s “drug
constitution” took place in the 1970s. Terminally ill cancer patients filed a
suit challenging the FDA’s prohibition on the sale of Laetrile. They argued
that the FDCA’s statutory objective of protecting patients from “unsafe”
and “ineffective” drugs simply had no relevance for terminally ill people
and that the court should therefore infer an exception for them. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, asking,
“[W]hat can … ‘safe’ and ‘effective’ mean as to such persons who are so
fatally stricken with a disease for which there is no known cure?” 53 But in
its 1979 decision in Rutherford v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court reversed this decision, concluding, “[W]e have no license to depart
from the plain language of the Act, for Congress could reasonably have
intended to shield terminal patients from ineffectual or unsafe drugs.” 54
In light of the Rutherford decision, those seeking to force a change in
the FDA’s approach in the face of AIDS realized that they would have to
pursue their goals outside of court. Conservative libertarians were the first
to try.
III. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE TREATMENT IND
Ronald Reagan rolled into the presidency on a wave of antigovernment fervor. The day after taking office, he announced the
establishment of a Presidential Task Force for Regulatory Relief chaired by
Vice-President (later President) George H. W. Bush. This body was charged
with eliminating and reforming inefficient and burdensome federal
regulations. The next month, Reagan issued his famous Executive Order
12291, which required agencies to perform a cost-benefit analysis on all
51
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“major rules” and transmit these analyses for review to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). 55 The essential philosophy behind 12291
was that “Regulatory Action should not be undertaken unless the potential
benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society.” 56
The Reagan Administration viewed the FDA as a prime target for its
deregulatory efforts. Bush’s Task Force identified the drug approval process
as one of 20 government regulatory programs in greatest need of reform. 57
Although the administration’s primary goal with respect to the FDA was
shrinking the “drug lag,” it also resolved to formalize the system by which
severely ill patients could gain access to unapproved therapies. In June
1983, as part of a proposed broad reform of the IND requirements, the
agency announced its intention to codify the agency’s various pre-approval
access practices under the name “Treatment IND.” 58 The FDA explained
that it was acting “in accordance with Executive Order 12291 [and] the
mandate of the President’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief.” 59
This initial proposal was rather restrained. It limited treatment INDs to
situations involving patients with serious diseases and no alternative
therapies. It authorized the FDA to deny a request for a treatment IND
whenever there was “not sufficient evidence of the drug’s safety and
effectiveness to justify its intended treatment use.” Moreover, the proposal
provided that investigational drugs would ordinarily become available for
treatment use only after the end of phase 2 studies. 60 Finally, the FDA
proposed that companies be permitted to charge for (rather than donate) the
drugs released pursuant to a treatment IND only with the express written
approval of the agency, based upon a showing that such sale was
“required.” This restriction was a major disincentive to participation by
industry. 61
The treatment IND proposal was not a response to the AIDS crisis. At
the time of its issuance in 1983, the disease had only recently emerged as a
matter of public concern outside the gay community. Over the next few
years, however, the treatment IND became closely linked to AIDS in
particular. As the disease spread virulently, PWAs learned to their distress
55
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that they could rarely obtain experimental therapies through the FDA’s
existing compassionate use programs. Between 1983 and 1987, the agency
permitted the compassionate use of only two unapproved AIDS-related
drugs. 62 AIDS advocates thus began urging the administration to finalize the
treatment IND rulemaking.
PWAs were not the only ones exasperated by the FDA’s caution with
respect to investigational treatments. Some of the loudest voices in favor of
lowering the regulatory barriers were from the conservative side of the
spectrum. Ronald Reagan himself was famously apathetic about AIDS—he
publicly mentioned it only once before 1987. 63 Nonetheless, the treatment
IND program promised to benefit victims of all life-threatening illnesses,
not just AIDS. Moreover, it fit the conservative movement’s broader
deregulatory mission.
Some libertarians implored the FDA to help PWAs in particular. In a
January 1987 New York Times op-ed column drawn from a Cato Institute
report, Dale Gieringer declared: “Reform is needed to allow [AIDS]
patients freedom of access to experimental drugs…. A country that honors
free choice in religion, speech, and politics should also honor free choice in
medicine.” 64 The next month, the Washington Post’s conservative columnist
Charles Krauthammer called for the immediate approval of AZT. “Now that
we have strong evidence that AZT works for some with AIDS, you cannot
ethically deny it to any AIDS sufferer who would risk taking it.”
Acknowledging that “turning AZT loose on the market” would make
clinical research “very difficult,” Krauthammer nonetheless concluded that
“surely the claims of scientific knowledge have their limits.” 65
The FDA was not ignoring the treatment IND proposal during this
period, but rather clashing with more committed deregulators at OMB. 66 In
62
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July 1985, FDA Commissioner Frank Young decided to issue a final
version of the IND amendments with the treatment IND provisions
unchanged from the 1983 proposal. Seven months later, however, OMB—
reviewing the rule under Executive Order 12291—demanded various
revisions to the treatment IND section. These changes included, among
others, the elimination of the requirement that those seeking treatment INDs
show “sufficient evidence” of safety and effectiveness and the deletion of
the language restricting the sale of products distributed pursuant to a
treatment IND. Months of discussions ensued in which HHS and FDA
officials attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to obtain OMB’s permission to
re-insert safeguards and limitations into the rule. 67
In March 1987, the FDA published a reproposal of the treatment IND
rule. 68 Compared with the 1983 proposal, the reproposal promised to
dramatically increase the availability of investigational drugs. First, it
required the agency to grant treatment INDs if the listed criteria were
satisfied. Second, it shifted the evidentiary burden onto the FDA, requiring
the agency to approve a treatment IND request unless “the drug clearly does
not provide a therapeutic benefit” or would expose patients “to an
unreasonable and significant additional risk of illness or injury.” 69 Third,
whereas the original proposed rule had provided that experimental drugs
could ordinarily become available for treatment use only after the end of
phase 2 studies, the reproposal explicitly authorized the FDA to permit such
use earlier in the investigational process “in the case of an immediately lifethreatening disease, or in other appropriate circumstances.” 70
Finally, the 1987 reproposal recognized that unless manufacturers
could charge for unapproved drugs under the rule, “[t]here might be no
incentive for a sponsor to supply investigational drugs for treatment use,
thus denying the drug to patients who . . . choose to avail themselves of this
treatment.” 71 The reproposal thus allowed drug sponsors to charge for
67

The only notable concessions they appear to have won were, first, to apply the
lower evidentiary burden only to drugs for “immediately life-threatening diseases” and,
second, to publish the treatment IND provisions as a reproposal, rather than as a final rule
along with the rest of the IND regulations.
68
52 Fed. Reg. 8,850, 8,855-57 (Mar. 19, 1987).
69
52 Fed. Reg. at 8,856. The preamble explained that for immediately life-threatening
diseases, “Requiring a degree of proof only slightly less than is necessary for general
market distribution would unnecessarily restrict a drug that could provide real benefits in
the particular case under treatment.” Id. 8851.
70
48 Fed. Reg. at 26,742; 52 Fed. Reg. at 8,856. Because one condition for granting a
treatment IND was that the drug be “under investigation in a controlled clinical trial under
an IND,” the proposal seemed to contemplate that a treatment IND drug must at least have
entered phase 2 studies. Id.
71
52 Fed. Reg. at 8,854.

21

America’s Drug Constitution

treatment IND drugs after merely notifying the FDA, although it forbade
them to commercially promote or market such products and allowed the
agency to prohibit prices that were “manifestly unfair.” 72
The reproposal triggered a ferocious negative reaction. A diverse
assortment of forces lined up to oppose what they perceived to be an
excessive diminishment of FDA’s gatekeeping role.
There were Democratic congressmen who advocated a traditional,
precautionary approach to consumer protection, such as Representative Ted
Weiss of New York and Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. Weiss,
who chaired a hearing on the treatment IND reproposal in April 1987,
opened the proceedings by warning: “The proliferation, in uncontrolled
settings, of inadequately evaluated, potentially dangerous experimental
drugs is a prescription for the premature deaths and needless suffering of
large numbers of people.” 73 Weiss further contended that OMB, “under the
guise of assisting people with AIDS … is, in fact, attempting to dismantle
the whole regulatory process.” 74
There was the biomedical research establishment, which worried
primarily about the impact the proposal would have on clinical research. 75
Dr. Charles Moertel of the Mayo Clinic, for example, asserted at Weiss’s
hearing: “I am confident that this reproposed rule would seriously impair
our ability to conduct the adequate and well controlled studies necessary to
confirm the true safety and effectiveness of new drugs…. [T]here would be
absolutely no motivation for a patient to enter a randomized study.” 76 Dr.
Maureen Myers, the Chief of the AIDS Treatment Branch at the National
Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases, similarly rued the impact the
reproposal would have on NIH’s ability to conduct studies of AIDS drugs.
She concluded, “As an example of deregulation, I feel this is a disastrous
choice.” 77
There was the FDA bureaucracy itself, which embraced the same
scientific worldview as the researchers and, moreover, took pride in its own
consumer protection function. An FDA official informed Weiss’s staff that
he did not know of a single person within the agency’s drug center who
supported the treatment IND reproposal. 78 Previous FDA leaders expressed
skepticism as well. Richard Cooper, testifying at Weiss’s hearing on behalf
72
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of a bipartisan group of five former FDA commissioners and four former
chief counsels, urged that the reproposal be revised to require that there be
“some scientific evidence on the basis of which an expert could rationally
conclude that the drug may be effective in the intended population.” The
rule as written, Cooper cautioned, “could provide an unintended opportunity
for the marketing of governmentally legitimized quack drugs ….” 79
There were the influential consumer protection organizations, who
were uniformly opposed to the reproposal. 80 Sidney Wolfe, the head of the
Health Research Group within Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen, opined that
PWAs and their advocates were making a grave error by pushing for earlier
release of drugs. “I see this really as against the interests of a large
proportion of AIDS patients. We have drug safety and efficacy laws so that
we can tell the difference between something better than what may be
around and something that may be worse.” 81
Finally, there was the pharmaceutical industry. Despite many liberals’
suspicions that the treatment IND reproposal was part of a corporate plot,
the industry was not enthusiastic about it.82 Although drug companies
unambiguously favored a faster and less burdensome drug approval
process, they were ambivalent at best about a rule that would facilitate preapproval release. The distribution of unapproved drugs for treatment use
presented product supply challenges and posed tort liability risk. Although
the reproposal allowed manufacturers to charge, it prohibited the
commercial promotion of unapproved drugs and subjected their prices to
FDA review. Finally, pre-approval distribution of drugs might disrupt the
clinical investigations the manufacturers had to complete to obtain FDA
approval. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association (PMA), the trade
association for large drug companies, did not take a public position on the
reproposal, but it may have worked behind the scenes to weaken it. 83 The
Wall Street Journal editorial page, which championed the reproposal,
angrily charged the PMA with obstructing it. 84
The combined forces arrayed against radical deregulation succeeding in
overcoming OMB. The final rule, issued in May 1987, pulled back
79
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significantly from the reproposal. 85 Now, the regulation authorized FDA to
deny a treatment IND for a drug for an immediately life-threatening disease
“if the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, fails to provide a
reasonable basis for concluding that the drug may be effective for its
intended use.” 86 Because the regulation did not define “reasonable basis,”
this provision gave the FDA great latitude to block a treatment IND for any
drug that had not completed phase 2 trials. Moreover, the final rule capped
the amount companies could charge for treatment IND drugs at the price
“necessary to recover costs of manufacture, research, development, and
handling” of the product. 87
IV. AIDS ACTIVISTS JOIN THE FRAY
While this battle over the treatment IND rule raged within the
government, gay rights and AIDS organizations mostly sat on the sidelines.
The gay community remained surprisingly uninvolved in FDA drug policy
during the first five years of the epidemic. It focused more on other
problems, such as widespread virulent homophobia and the potential
imposition of coercive disease control measures.
As AIDS spread in the early 1980s, powerful religious conservatives
voiced venomous attitudes about gay people and PWAs. Senator Jesse
Helms, for example, declared: “Americans who don’t want to risk being
killed by AIDS have a clear choice and a safe bet available: Reject sodomy
and practice morality.” 88 Influential televangelist Jerry Falwell, co-founder
of the Moral Majority, commented: “If we choose to violate God’s law, we
bring that retribution upon ourselves.” 89 Such statements echoed the antigay views of a depressingly broad swath of the population. In a national
poll conducted in July 1986—two weeks after the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of state prohibitions on homosexual sex
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in Bowers v. Hardwick 90—57 percent of respondents opined that “gay or
lesbian relations between consenting adults … should not be legal.” 91
Public opinions about homosexuality at this time were shaped not only
by traditional morals, but also by panic about AIDS. Although the disease
was still confined largely to gay men and intravenous drug users, 92
Americans feared that it would evolve into a pandemic transmitted through
heterosexual sex or even nonsexual exposure. The July 1985 cover of Life
warned: “Now No One is Safe from AIDS.” 93 Like the Jews accused of
causing the Black Death by poisoning wells, gay men were almost
inevitable scapegoats for this emerging modern plague. 94 They increasingly
found themselves fired from their jobs, evicted from their apartments,
physically assaulted, and socially shunned. 95
The nation debated various coercive measures to quell the epidemic.
Many politicians (including Vice President Bush) advocated mandatory
AIDS testing in certain situations. 96 In the New York Times, conservative
commentator William F. Buckley appeared to recommend universal AIDS
testing and the compulsory tattooing of those found to be HIV-positive. 97
Various government officials publicly entertained the idea of an AIDS
quarantine. 98 In the Washington Post, a physician who supported quarantine
rejected the very notion that AIDS victims had “rights.” He concluded,
“[T]he threat of AIDS demands from us all a discrimination based on our
instinct for survival against a peril that, if not somehow controlled, can
destroy this society.” 99
Accordingly, until the late 1980s, AIDS advocates had a primarily
defensive agenda, namely, warding off measures such as mandatory testing
and internment. Activist Gregg Bordowitz remembers: “Our first charge
was to awaken the community to the possibilities of some very serious
90
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repressive actions against us, and to defend ourselves.” 100 FDA reform was
simply not their first priority.
The FDA demonstration in October 1988 thus represented an important
pivot point for the AIDS movement. As Bordowitz explains:
What [the] FDA [action] did was shift the group away from a defensive
posture to an offensive posture … and enabled us to come up with a vision for
the way that healthcare should be done in this country, the way that drugs
should be researched, and sold, and made available. Most importantly [sic] …
was the idea that people with AIDS should be at the center of the public
discussion on AIDS. 101

What explains the timing of this reorientation? Overwhelming
frustration with the government’s inadequate response to AIDS certainly
had something to do with it. But there was also an important attitudinal shift
within the gay community itself. American homophobia was no longer
simply an obstacle for ACT UP; it was becoming a source of cohesion and
strength. The activists’ struggle with the FDA was bolstered by an
intensifying sense of gay pride and a fierce commitment to fighting societal
hostility and apathy. The Parklawn Building protest was not only an effort
to mobilize the government against a horrific disease; it was also a forum
for the declaration of gay rights and for the assertion of gay identity. 102
An additional prerequisite for the FDA demonstration was the
emergence of a new attitude among activists regarding the proper role of
government in the crisis. Before 1988, representatives of the major gay
rights and AIDS groups tended to cling to their pro-regulation progressive
roots and defend the FDA’s authority. For example, Jeff Levi, the Executive
Director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, opposed the 1987
treatment IND reproposal discussed above, even though it would have made
experimental drugs more readily available to PWAs. He sneered: “This is a
scheme by the drug companies to get rid of government regulation…. This
is Ronald Reagan trying to deregulate the pharmaceutical industry.” 103 But
around that time, a new type of AIDS advocate was emerging. These
activists rejected the notion that as “liberals” they should always favor more
regulation. Their foremost goal of “getting drugs into bodies” trumped all
other concerns.
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One such figure was San Francisco-based Martin Delaney, the founder
of Project Inform. Delaney, gay but HIV-negative, had been a Roman
Catholic seminarian, elementary school teacher, and management
consultant before becoming a full-time AIDS treatment activist in the early
1980s. 104 In April 1987, he told the 10,000 subscribers to his newsletter, PI
Perspective, that the treatment IND reproposal, though a useful step, did not
go far enough. 105 After the more restrictive final rule came out in October,
Delaney met with the prominent Washington, D.C. lawyer C. Boyden Gray,
counsel to Vice-President Bush and to the Presidential Task Force on
Regulatory Relief. 106 Gray, one of the brains behind the Reagan
Administration’s deregulatory efforts, told Delaney that the Treatment IND
rule was “our pride and joy.” Delaney responded that the final version of
the regulation was a “sham” and “a lemon.” 107 Gray promised to study the
matter further, and the two men established a working relationship that
continued into Bush’s own presidency.
For several years, Delaney had been helping to forge an alternative
method for PWAs to obtain unapproved medications—importation from
foreign countries. Although the importation of unapproved drugs is illegal
under the FDCA, the FDA had long exercised enforcement discretion and
permitted individuals to transport “personal use” amounts of such products
into the country in their luggage or by mail. 108 After the start of the AIDS
epidemic, PWAs and their supporters began importing ever-increasing
volumes of unapproved drugs from other countries, particularly Mexico.
Many of these imported batches—too large to conform to any commonsense understanding of “personal use”—were, with Project Inform’s advice
and coordination, distributed by underground networks and sold in “buyers’
clubs” and “guerilla clinics.” 109 FDA acquiesced to most of these operations
without explanation.
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Then, in early 1988, the U.S. Customs Service began seizing packages
of an unapproved AIDS drug called dextran sulfate mailed from Japan. 110
Delaney personally lobbied FDA officials to issue a written document that
would clarify the personal importation policy. 111 On July 23, 1988, in a
widely-publicized speech at a gay and lesbian health conference in Boston,
Frank Young announced the release of a new “Pilot Guidance for Release
of Mail Importations.” 112 An unnamed federal official speculated to Science
magazine that the commissioner had gone “temporarily insane.” 113 In truth,
the guidance was merely an affirmation of existing FDA policy. 114 But
Young’s action had symbolic import and, as a practical matter, prevented
further seizure of dextran sulfate shipments.
Meanwhile, activists on the East Coast also began to demand that the
FDA expedite access to AIDS drugs. One of the first was Marty Robinson,
who in 1986 helped form a group of aggressive AIDS protesters in New
York called the Lavender Hill Mob. 115 At Weiss’s congressional hearing,
Robinson, representing this group, testified that even the OMB-shaped
reproposal of the treatment IND was too restrictive. He dismissed it as
“tokenism and public relations, nothing more” and demanded “greater
availability of drugs undergoing Phase II testing.” 116
Larry Kramer, a confrontational and abrasive New York author and
playwright, soon moved to the forefront of the East Coast cohort of AIDS
activists challenging the FDA. Kramer co-founded the Gay Men’s Health
Crisis in 1982. He left the organization the following year, after the other
directors—tired of his shouting, wary of his militancy, affronted by his
condemnation of reckless sexual conduct—forced him off the board. 117 On
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March 10, 1987, Kramer—not yet aware that he was HIV-positive—
delivered a speech at the Lesbian and Gay Community Services Center in
Greenwich Village calling for the creation of a new AIDS organization
committed to direct action. 118 Two days later, Kramer and other activists
(including Robinson) gathered at the Center and founded the group that
would soon be named the Aids Coalition to Unleash Power—ACT UP. 119
The organization’s initial demands included, among others, the appointment
of an FDA “undercommissioner” from within the AIDS community, the
“immediate testing and expeditious release of experimental drugs,” the
elimination of placebo trials, and the removal of FDA’s authority over trials
of AIDS drugs. 120
On March 23, Kramer wrote a scathing opinion essay in the New York
Times titled “The F.D.A.’s Callous Response to AIDS.” 121 The FDA had
approved the NDA for AZT three days earlier, but Kramer scornfully
dismissed this action as a “sop to the gay community.” He furiously
attacked the agency’s reluctance to allow pre-approval access to other
medications. “Doctors everywhere are waiting to put into immediate use a
battery of drugs that have passed Phase One safety trials,” he insisted.
“AIDS sufferers, who have nothing to lose, are more than willing to be
guinea pigs…. [W]e cannot understand for the life of us, or for what life in
us many of us still cling to hungrily, why the F.D.A. withholds [these drugs]
especially when the victims are so eager to be part of the experimental
process.” 122
The next day, ACT UP conducted its first public demonstration—a
march on Wall Street in which protesters demanded the immediate release
of seven specific drugs and burned FDA Commissioner Young in effigy. 123
A year and a half later, ACT UP demonstrators descended on the Parklawn
Building.
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V. TACTICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
A. Getting Inside the Agency

The FDA was a tricky target for this burgeoning social movement.
Even in an age of diminishing trust in government, the agency retained the
broad approval of the American population. 124 The public, and FDA
employees themselves, saw the agency’s primary role as protecting people
from dangerous and ineffective products. Moreover, the FDA’s decisions
were not always transparent to ordinary Americans; they occurred behind a
veil of scientific complexity, technical expertise, and administrative
bureaucracy. Finally, some of the country’s widespread homophobia
inevitably bled into the agency itself. In an article that appeared soon after
the Parklawn action, an unnamed top FDA official corroborated the
protesters’ claims that the agency was lagging on AIDS drugs because the
majority of PWAs were homosexuals. He himself observed: “Most of [the
demonstrators] were of the gay bent and thus they have to face the
consequences of their lifestyle.” 125
What tactics were available for AIDS activists to influence the
procedures and decisions of a federal administrative agency like the FDA?
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grants citizens a right to submit
comments on rules proposed by agencies. 126 Nevertheless, despite court
decisions requiring the preambles accompanying final rules to address the
points raised by comments, 127 agencies maintain extremely broad discretion
to reject commenters’ objections and suggestions. The APA also compels
agencies to provide interested persons the right to petition for new rules, 128
but agencies have no obligation whatsoever to grant such petitions. In any
event, many of the critical determinations the FDA makes with respect to
drugs—including its decisions on INDs and NDAs—are not “rules” subject
to the APA’s public participation provisions.
The AIDS activists thus decided that their campaign for bodily freedom
must commence with their mass bodily presence at the FDA itself. When
they concocted the idea of a protest at FDA headquarters, ACT UP’s David
Barr and Mickey Wheatley explained:
“… we have this idea for a strategy that would be very different than
things that have been tried before in activism.… [M]any groups have gone to
Washington and protested in front of the White House. Many groups have
protested in front of Congress. For our movement, we need to go to the Food
124
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and Drug Administration…. This is an institution that is very specific to the
issues that we’re facing.” 129

Importantly, the Parklawn action’s organizers always viewed the event
as merely a first step. Their ultimate objective was to be invited inside the
building, to participate in the meetings where FDA employees forged drug
policy with scientists and industry representatives. “The idea was to cut
through the bureaucratic red tape of the Food and Drug Administration,”
Bordowitz recalls. “But more than that, that people with AIDS should be
involved in every level of decision-making concerning research for a
treatment and a cure for our disease.” 130 It is telling that ACT UP titled the
action “Seize Control of FDA” rather than, for example, “Burn Down
FDA.” Unlike the dietary supplement and Laetrile protesters of the 1970s,
most AIDS activists thought the FDA had an important role to play. Rather
than seeking to eliminate FDA regulation of AIDS drugs, they strove to
participate in the agency’s processes and thus reform its scientific and
regulatory vision. 131
The outside component of ACT UP’s outside-inside strategy was
nonetheless vital to the movement’s success. The mass actions at the FDA
and (in 1990) at NIH helped not only to thrust the treatment activists inside
the halls of government, but also to ensure that the federal bureaucracy and
the public at large would perceive the development and release of AIDS
drugs as a momentous matter of social justice. To this day, members of the
“insider” treatment group credit their achievements to both aspects of the
outside-inside approach. 132 As we will see, however, once ACT UP’s
treatment specialists gained access to the government policymakers, a
growing divide developed between them and the broader AIDS activist
community. Their views diverged regarding not only tactics, but also the
movement’s fundamental principles and goals.
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B. “With Friends Like These …”

As the AIDS movement forged ahead with its FDA reform agenda
following the Parklawn protest, it confronted a major conundrum: how to
manage its alliance with conservative deregulators.
When sociologists began to study AIDS activism, the prevailing theory
of social movements was the “political process” theory, which viewed
political opportunities as a precondition to the formation of such
movements. 133 As enumerated by Sidney Tarrow, such opportunities
included access to power, the availability of influential allies, and divisions
within the ruling elites. 134 Deborah Gould, a leading scholar of AIDS
activism, concluded that ACT UP did not conform to the political
opportunity model because it “arose as a national movement in 1987,
amidst the growing conservatism of the Reagan/Bush years. Lesbians, gay
men, and AIDS advocates lacked meaningful access to power and
influential allies, and benefitted from no significant splits in the ruling
alignment or cleavages among elites.” 135 Gould thus sought out other
explanations for ACT UP’s rise and settled on the role of shifting emotions
in the gay and lesbian communities. 136
Though Gould’s focus on emotion is an invaluable addition to the
literature, she overstates the AIDS movement’s lack of political opportunity
in the late 1980s, particularly with respect to FDA reform. First of all, it is
important to observe that by this time, a solid majority of Americans shared
ACT UP’s position with respect to drug regulation. The country’s views
had shifted dramatically in a strikingly brief period. In 1979, when a
national poll asked respondents whether they agreed that a drug for a
serious health problem “should not be made available until it is known to be
completely safe and effective,” 60 percent agreed strongly and 14 percent
agreed mildly. 137 By contrast, in 1989, no less than 79 percent of
respondents told a pollster that the government should allow people with
133
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AIDS to be treated with drugs that had not been fully tested and
approved. 138 Moreover, despite Gould’s assertion, there was a significant
split in the ruling elite regarding drug regulation, as illustrated by the battle
between OMB and other stakeholders over the Treatment IND rule.
Finally, notwithstanding Gould’s statement, the AIDS activists had
significant allies on the conservative side of the political spectrum, among
libertarians and radical deregulators. Just hours after the 1988 Parklawn
demonstration, ACT UP’s Peter Staley (the aforementioned “Karate Kid”)
appeared on the CNN political debate show Crossfire. Patrick Buchanan,
the interlocutor “on the right,” told him: “Mr. Staley, this is going to
astonish you, but I agree with you a hundred percent. I think if someone’s
got AIDS and someone wants to take a drug, it’s their life and if it gives
him hope he oughta be able to take it.” 139 Although Staley may have been
startled to hear this statement of support from the often intolerant Buchanan
in particular, he doubtless was already aware that some conservatives
supported facilitating access to AIDS drugs. After all, a recent New York
Times article on critics of the final Treatment IND rule had included an
excerpt from a report by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank,
alongside a quotation from Martin Delaney. 140
Following the “Seize the FDA” action, leading AIDS advocates
suggested publicly that they welcomed this alliance. Delaney observed,
“AIDS activists are aligning themselves with deregulators. The liberals who
want to be our friends are obstacles to F.D.A. deregulation.” 141 Larry
Kramer acknowledged that conservative Republicans were “strange
bedfellows” for his largely gay, overwhelmingly left-leaning movement, but
he concluded, “[W]hat liberal support is there?” 142
It was not the first time in American history that an unlikely coalition
was forged in the cause of medical liberty. 143 This particular alliance was
striking, however, because of the extremely narrow range of issues on
138
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which the two sides agreed. The worldviews of ACT UP and the
Reagan/Bush conservatives were breathtakingly different outside narrow
questions of FDA drug policy. Despite its demands that the FDA loosen up
its drug regulations, ACT UP generally favored activist government.
Indeed, the organization was simultaneously conducting a campaign for
national healthcare. By contrast, Reagan famously intoned in his first
inaugural address that “government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem,” 144 and his administration was guided by this
principle in all areas besides national security.
Indeed, apart from FDA’s role, AIDS activists and Republican
libertarians even diverged on how best to address the AIDS crisis. The
former contended that the search for a cure demanded the unstinting
financial support and extensive involvement of the federal government.
Kramer, for instance, urged the establishment of a federal “Manhattan
Project” for AIDS. 145 Throughout the Reagan presidency, however,
government funding for AIDS research, though steadily climbing, fell far
short of what AIDS activists (and scientists) believed was needed. 146 The
spending increases that did occur reflected the demands of Congressional
Democrats, not the Reagan Administration; in his 1986 budget, the
president actually proposed cutting the appropriation for AIDS research by
22 percent. 147
The two groups also differed in their ultimate ambitions regarding FDA
drug regulation generally. The true motives of at least some libertarians on
the right were revealed when the Wall Street Journal’s editors invoked the
AIDS crisis in calling for repeal of the FDCA’s requirement that
manufacturers demonstrate efficacy prior to approval. 148 The Heritage
Foundation, meanwhile, proposed that the FDA be stripped of its
gatekeeping power over drugs altogether and that the agency’s role be
144
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reduced to ensuring accurate labeling. 149 By contrast, the ACT UP FDA
Action Handbook, distributed to participants in the Parklawn demonstration,
warned: “AIDS advocates must be careful to keep their agenda, supporting
earlier access to promising life-saving drugs …., from becoming confused
with the Bush deregulation/Wall St. Journal/Heritage Foundation agenda of
sweeping drug industry deregulation. It would be a disaster for all American
consumers, including people with HIV infection, if the Kefauver [1962]
Amendments were repealed and drug companies were no longer required to
prove safety [sic] and efficacy for most drugs.” 150
When George H. W. Bush took the reins of power in January 1989, he
inherited the Reagan administration’s deregulatory philosophy and
mechanisms. The beginning of Bush’s presidency coincided with the initial
meetings of an organization called the “National Committee to Review
Current Procedures for Approval of New Drugs for Cancer and AIDS.”
Then-Vice President Bush had established this body in 1988, when he was
serving as the head of Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 151 The
committee, chaired by Louis Lasagna of Tufts University, was tasked with
exploring ways to “improve access … to promising new treatments, and
facilitate the transfer of new therapies to medical practice.” 152 At one of the
committee’s first sessions, Lasagna made his own ideological predilections
clear.
There is a tendency for the public to favor a more libertarian point of view
today. They’re saying, “I don't want Big Daddy to make judgments for me.”
… Personally, I don’t want patients with remedial cancer that could be
successfully treated by other means to go to Laetrile. But if the cancer is
nonresponsive, if they are terminal, I would rather have the patient go to their
physician and get Laetrile, if that’s what they want, than run off to Mexico. 153

The AIDS activists needed to decide how closely to work with such
conservative deregulators. Delaney seemed less reluctant than most, but
other treatment activists also overcame their aversion to sitting in the same
room as Republicans. Nevertheless, AIDS movement leaders recognized
that this was, at best, an alliance of convenience and that they would have to
manage the relationship carefully.
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C. Articulating an Ideology of Liberty

A related challenge confronted by the AIDS movement was articulating
the nature and extent of the freedom they demanded. Few members of the
AIDS community embraced a thoroughgoing libertarianism like that of
some deregulators on the right. So what type of liberty were they
advocating for?
Elsewhere, I have elucidated four “strands” of liberty that together
supported the notion of freedom of therapeutic choice in the nineteenth
century:
bodily
freedom,
economic
freedom,
freedom
of
religion/conscience, and freedom of inquiry. 154 These strands combined into
a robust, multidimensional vision of a right to medical choice—a right that
was clearly “constitutional,” even though nineteenth-century Americans
vindicated it almost entirely outside of court. By contrast, the AIDS
activists of the late twentieth century wholeheartedly embraced only the
first of these strands. The second and third were not core elements of their
worldview. Even more problematically, unregulated inquiry, once promoted
as an engine of medical progress, had become, in the context of modern
medicine, a threat to the development of an AIDS cure.
Bodily freedom was always a central feature of the AIDS movement’s
liberty rhetoric. As early as 1983, the quasi-constitutional “Denver
Principles,” drawn up at the first national gathering of AIDS activists, listed
as one of the “Rights of People with AIDS” a right “[t]o full explanations of
all medical procedures and risks, to choose or refuse their treatment
modalities, to refuse to participate in research without [sic] jeopardizing
their treatment and to make informed decisions about their lives.” 155 When
ACT UP formed four years later, the organization’s “first principle,”
activist Jim Eigo remembered, was “the whole idea that people with AIDS,
or people with HIV, had a right to make decisions about their lives, their
treatment, how they were treated at every stage of their disease ….” 156
Such statements illustrate the AIDS movement’s indebtedness to the
patients’ rights movement of the early 1970s and its emphasis on informed
consent. 157 The AIDS activists sought a level of bodily autonomy that
transcended these earlier calls for patients’ rights, however. First, their
ideology of bodily freedom extended beyond health issues to sexual
154

Grossman, supra note 26 at 112–123; Grossman, supra note 26.
Denver Principles, , http://www.actupny.org/documents/Denver.html (last visited
Aug 5, 2015).
156
Jim Eigo interview, Mar. 5, 2004, at 16-17 (interview # 047 of AUOHP).
157
See, e.g., American Hospital Association’s 1973 Patients’ Bill of Rights, reprinted
in RUTH R. FADEN JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH & TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
93 (1986).
155

35

America’s Drug Constitution

36

conduct and expression. 158 Furthermore, in addition to demanding informed
consent with regard to already-available drugs, they also pressed for access
to treatments that the government was denying them. In both of these
respects, the true progenitor of ACT UP’s bodily freedom philosophy was
the women’s health movement of the 1970s.
From the time of its inception, ACT UP included a large cohort of
women, many with experience in feminist, women’s health, and
reproductive rights advocacy. 159 These women—many of them lesbians—
shared their ideology and tactical experience with their gay male
counterparts. 160 ACT UP member Robert Vazquez-Pacheco opined: “ACT
UP, historically, directly came from … the women’s health movement.” 161
Fellow activist Heidi Dorow observed that “a lot of … issues were
overlapping” in the reproductive rights and AIDS advocacy movements.
“Whether it’s—access to reproductive health services; safer sex
information; control of your body …. They have common cause.” 162
The abortion rights aspect of the women’s health movement was a
particularly potent model for ACT UP members. Brian Zabcik “always saw
a very strong relationship” between abortion rights and AIDS advocacy. He
explained, “In both instances, we were trying to work for a solution that
would help people avoid being punished for their sexual mistakes.” 163 ACT
UP members participated enthusiastically in pro-choice mobilization events
because, in one member’s words: “They’re the same issue. It’s about
control over our bodies.” 164 Not coincidentally, “choice” became the most
important word in ACT UP’s verbal arsenal. Jim Serafini of ACT UP San
158
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Francisco declared: “Real choice in treatment, parity with established
medical authority and freedom to learn and risk intelligently, sums up what
ACT UP demands. Sounds all-American, doesn’t it? It is because it is
about freedom and choice.” 165
In the nineteenth century, the bodily freedom strand of the right to
medical choice was bolstered by a strong commitment to economic
freedom. During the AIDS crisis, some conservative deregulators took a
similar position, contending that FDA drug regulation improperly violated
contractual liberty. For example, Sam Kazman of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute opined:
Restoring the right of contract might do more for [PWAs] than any other
change in the world of law…. [I]n cases of untreatable diseases …
unapproved drugs would no longer be categorically barred. Instead, they could
now be available by prescription, with a clear warning of their unapproved
status…. Those who wished to rely on FDA's judgment could continue to do
so. The rest of us could knowingly, and contractually, assume the risks of
unconventional therapies…. Such an exercise of the right of contract is
nothing more than what the Framers intended 200 years ago …. 166

Although Mark Milano of ACT UP similarly suggested that the FDA
require drug manufacturers to “put the data on the label” and let the
“marketplace” decide, such arguments were relatively rare among AIDS
activists. 167 The AIDS community as a whole did not want to abolish the
FDA’s gatekeeping role. Moreover, AIDS groups did not hesitate to urge
government intervention into the free market when, for example, protesting
high drug prices. 168
Meanwhile, the traditional freedom of religion/conscience strand of
medical liberty—so essential when the therapies being defended were
Christian Science and Mind Cure—were largely absent from the AIDS
activists’ campaign for FDA reform. Faith and belief were not core
elements of their modern scientific approach to finding a cure. The closest
the AIDS activists came to acknowledging a nonmaterialist element of
medicine were their occasional paeans to the value of “hope.”
165
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Finally, in stark contrast to their nineteenth-century forebears, the
leading AIDS treatment activists emphatically rejected the value of the
fourth strand—“freedom of inquiry”—in the sense of unrestricted
experimentation by individual patients and doctors. Advocates for
therapeutic choice had once celebrated the decentralized, unfettered
gathering of information as the most effective method for advancing
society’s therapeutic knowledge. But since the middle of the twentieth
century, modern scientific medicine—the system in which AIDS activists
placed their hopes—has deemed such individualized experimentation to be
irrelevant to the determination of a treatment’s efficacy. The FDA-regulated
controlled clinical trial has become the “gold standard” for establishing
efficacy. Because such trials are randomized and controlled (ideally,
placebo-controlled), this model of investigation is, at root, premised on
denying participants a free choice of therapy. Indeed, because such studies
are double-blinded, patients and physicians are not even aware of what
therapy (if any) the patients are taking.
Furthermore, in the eyes of the FDA, medical researchers, and even
some AIDS activists, the widespread trial-and-error use of experimental
AIDS drugs outside of clinical studies was not merely irrelevant to medical
progress, but actually threatened to undermine it. Why, they asked, would a
PWA enroll in a controlled clinical study of a promising new medicine, and
risk receiving the control, when he could obtain the experimental drug for
certain elsewhere? If too many patients were diverted away from clinical
trials, and these trials were thus not completed, nobody would ever know
for sure whether new AIDS treatments provided any clinical benefit.
In the face of this tension, AIDS activists were left with only two
options. Some flatly insisted that PWAs’ personal right to choose was more
important than the advancement of medical knowledge. Others, by contrast,
prioritized the acquisition of scientific understanding but tried to
reconceptualize medical research so that the use of experimental drugs
outside of controlled studies would not interfere with the research, and
perhaps even contribute to it. Eventually, as we will see, these different
approaches proved to be irreconcilable, and bitter conflict divided the
movement. But first came some collective triumphs.
VI. EARLY VICTORY: SUBPART E
The Parklawn action quickly bore fruit. On October 19, 1988, barely
more than a week after the demonstration, the FDA issued a rule that, at
least on its face, promised speedier approval of AIDS drugs.
A chief demand of the AIDS activists was that the FDA should, when
considering the NDA for a drug for an incurable fatal disease, require less
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conclusive proof of efficacy than usual and instead err on the side of
approving the product and allowing patients to make their own risk-benefit
assessments. The FDA had seemed to embrace this approach in 1987 with
its extraordinarily rapid approval of AZT based on a single phase 2 study.
The activists had hoped that the agency would regulate other AIDS drugs
similarly, but at the time of “Seize the FDA,” AZT remained the only
approved treatment for the disease.
Two months before the Parklawn protest, Vice President Bush, acting
as chairman of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, had charged the FDA
with developing procedures for the expedited approval of therapies for
AIDS and other life-threatening diseases. 169 The day after the
demonstration, the Wall Street Journal reported that the administration’s
plan to “telescope the three phases of new-drug testing into two” was “on
the verge of collapsing” because of the resistance of “[c]areer bureaucrats
inside FDA.” 170 Then, six days later, the FDA suddenly announced a new,
immediately effective rule establishing procedures designed to speed the
approval of drugs for “life-threatening and severely debilitating
illnesses.” 171 Although the rule was not limited to AIDS drugs, the
Washington Post reported that the FDA issued it “primarily to assuage
AIDS activists.” 172
These “Subpart E” expedited development procedures (still in effect
today and partially codified in the FDCA under the rubric “Fast Track” 173)
invite drug sponsors to request early meetings with the FDA regarding the
design of animal and human studies. The most important such consultation
is an “end-of-phase 1 meeting” intended to discuss how the sponsor might
design data-rich phase 2 trials that will obviate the need to proceed to phase
3 before approval. 174 The Subpart E regulations also bind the FDA, when
considering NDAs for drugs for life-threatening and severely debilitating
illnesses, to perform a risk-benefit analysis that “tak[es] into consideration
the severity of the disease and the absence of satisfactory alternative
therapy.” 175 The preamble to the 1988 rule declared: “The agency
recognizes that safety and effectiveness are not absolute (i.e., not all drugs
are free of risk or have unequivocal benefits), but must be assessed in light
169
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of what condition the drug treats.” 176 The FDA thus embraced the AIDS
activists’ essential argument regarding drug approval—namely, that victims
of grave illnesses are willing to accept greater uncertainty and risk than are
people suffering from less serious ailments. 177
Although major newspapers gave the FDA’s announcement of the
Subpart E regulations front-page coverage, the AIDS community was
unenthusiastic. Martin Delaney acknowledged that the rule represented “a
touch of common sense” but added, “We got a nickel when we needed a
dollar.” 178 Other AIDS activists dismissed the FDA’s action as a cynical
campaign ploy by Bush, then in the final weeks of his ultimately successful
presidential race. 179 The rule’s detractors asserted that it was merely a
statement of flexibility and powers that the FDA already possessed—as
demonstrated by the AZT approval the previous year. Activists also
bemoaned the complete voluntariness of the Subpart E procedures and the
agency’s lack of sufficient resources to implement them. 180
In short, though the publication of Subpart E may have been a welcome
signal that the government now considered the AIDS movement a force to
be reckoned with, activists recognized that different tactics would be
required to realize truly meaningful change in FDA drug regulation.
VII. THE ACTIVISTS TRIUMPH: PARALLEL TRACK
A. Genesis of an Idea
Despite their dissatisfaction with the Subpart E regulations, the activists
quickly turned their attention to other matters. Because no anti-HIV drugs
were nearing FDA approval in autumn 1988—even under the most
expedited procedures—the activists focused instead on gaining access to
unapproved drugs earlier in their development, before they had even
entered phase 2 trials. 181
As discussed above, the final version of the 1987 Treatment IND rule
essentially required that there be a “reasonable basis” for concluding that
the unapproved drug was effective. The FDA was thus unlikely ever to
grant a treatment IND before positive results emerged from at least one
176
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phase 2 trial. In practice the agency tended to permit treatment use only
after the completion of phase 3. 182 This regime frustrated PWAs, who were
desperate to try potential therapies as soon as possible. AIDS groups thus
began demanding access to experimental drugs based solely on the results
of phase 1 trials, even though these uncontrolled studies are designed
primarily to assess safety, and they provide, at most, preliminary indications
of effectiveness.
The FDA sometimes allowed individuals to obtain drugs prior to the
commencement of phase 2 studies pursuant to compassionate use INDs or
“single patient exceptions,” but it was extremely reluctant to authorize
broader treatment access at this stage. Such a step would represent a
dramatic diminishment of the agency’s traditional consumer protection role.
Moreover, in the opinion of most regulators and researchers, widespread
release of a drug this early in the clinical research process would jeopardize
the enrollment and completion of controlled studies.
In an October 1988 speech before the Infectious Diseases Society of
America, Martin Delaney presented one of the first detailed arguments in
favor of nonetheless allowing PWAs to try drugs for which there was only
minimal evidence of effectiveness. He started by declaring his vision of the
nation’s fundamental values: “If public and individual good are not clearly
harmed, then the government should not stand in the way. That is the
American way.” 183 Therefore, he contended, “the burden of proof should
not be on those seeking access to experimental therapy but upon those who
seek to deny such access.” 184 Delaney rejected the argument, frequently
advanced by regulators, that PWAs must be protected from their own
desperation. This view, he opined, “smack[ed] of ‘big brother.’” He also
dismissed the common assertion that PWAs should be denied experimental
drugs because they “may do more harm than good.” He declared:
Although risks may exist, it is often equally possible that the treatment may do
more good than harm….
…. The question should be, “who gets to decide what risks are acceptable: the
bureaucracy in Washington or the patient whose life is on the line?” … [W]e
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feel that patients should be given some say in the final choice, acting along
with his or her [sic] physician …. 185

Finally, in a groundbreaking portion of his speech, Delaney addressed
the concern that wide access to experimental drugs would make clinical
research difficult or impossible to conduct. He observed that regardless of
any impact on research, “[m]any patients and their advocates find it morally
repugnant to deny potentially life-saving treatment to the masses to force
the few into clinical studies.” 186 Fortunately, Delaney continued, a choice
between individual liberties and the advancement of science in the public
interest was not necessary, because—contrary to widely held assumptions—
early treatment use of unapproved drugs served both.
Delaney urged his listeners to consider how clinical research actually
proceeds “in the laboratory of the real world.” 187 He explained that because
people join clinical trials for a variety of reasons (including “simple and
admirable altruism” 188), researchers would find sufficient numbers of
subjects for their controlled studies even if the experimental drugs were also
available through other avenues. Delaney then presented a daring and
counterintuitive argument. He contended that providing wide access to
unapproved drugs for treatment would actually enhance the clinical
research enterprise. He explained
the real-world AIDS experience … shows us that the policy of restriction is
itself destroying our ability to conduct clinical research. AIDS study centers
throughout the nation tell of widescale [sic] concurrent use of other
treatments; frequent cheating, even bribing, to gain entry to studies; mixing of
drugs by patients to share and dilute the risk of being on placebo; and rapid
dropping out of patients who learn that they are on placebo….
… If patients had other means of obtaining treatment, force-fitting them
into clinical studies would be unnecessary. Volunteers that remained would be
more likely to act as pure research subjects, entering studies not solely out of a
desperate effort to save their lives. 189

Delaney further argued that the simultaneous provision of experimental
therapies for treatment use outside clinical studies “in a structured and
monitored fashion” would itself provide “useful evidence of long-term
benefits and drawbacks.” 190
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Delaney emphasized that the fight against AIDS, “the medical
equivalent of war,” demanded a new approach. 191 “Inflexibly applied to the
AIDS epidemic, regulatory practices contribute to the failure of science,
demean the public good, and tread heavily on our civil liberties.” He
concluded: “[S]cience and patient alike would be better served by a system
that permits life-threatened patients some form of access to the most
promising experimental therapies, peacefully coexisting alongside a
program of unencumbered clinical research.” 192 Although he did not use the
precise words, Delaney had eloquently advocated the creation of what
would soon come to be known as the “parallel track.”
The term “parallel track” apparently entered public discourse in June
1989 at the International Conference on AIDS in Montreal. At this
meeting, members of ACT UP’s Treatment and Data (T&D) Committee
presented a document titled “A National AIDS Treatment Research
Agenda.” 193 Among many other items, this agenda proposed a “parallel
track” procedure permitting the treatment use of experimental drugs while
controlled efficacy trials were ongoing.
A revised version of the agenda published three months later
elaborated: “Parallel Track should encompass post-Phase I open-label
treatment protocols for people unable to participate in controlled clinical
trials for AIDS and HIV-related treatments.” 194 According to the document,
various categories of HIV-infected patients should be deemed “unable to
participate” in clinical trials and thus eligible for parallel track. They
included, among others, people who could not tolerate the standard
treatment being used as the active control, people for whom that standard
treatment had already failed, and people who were too sick to enroll in a
clinical trial or too distant from a study site. 195 The agenda emphasized that
safety and (if possible) efficacy data should be collected on parallel track
subjects, thus providing important early information on “real world” usage
of the experimental drug. 196 Finally, the document proposed that the parallel
track program be implemented by a newly created Parallel Track Advisory
Committee composed of government and industry representatives, AIDS
191
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primary care physicians, representatives of community-based research
groups, and—critically—“people with AIDS, HIV, and their advocates.” 197
During the months following the Montreal conference, ACT UP began
to participate in policy discussions inside the federal bureaucracy itself.
Simultaneously, and perhaps inevitably, T&D activists who had achieved
some mastery of the complex subjects of drug development and FDA
regulation began to dominate the organization’s pharmaceutical-related
efforts. With the exception of Iris Long, a straight female chemist, ACT
UP’s T&D Committee was composed of self-taught gay men. Jim Eigo, for
example, was an HIV-negative avant-garde writer in his 30s with a graduate
degree in theater but no post-secondary science education. Despite
extensive experience in antiwar and human rights activism, Eigo had no
connection to the gay rights movement before joining ACT UP. Another
prominent ACT UP treatment specialist was Mark Harrington, an HIVpositive aspiring screenwriter in his 20s. Harrington, who had majored in
visual and environmental studies at Harvard, had no background in
medicine other than menial temporary jobs in a hospital. He had been
entirely apolitical before becoming involved in AIDS activism. The tactics
and attitudes of this brilliant cluster of autodidacts increasingly
differentiated them from the broad mass of ACT UP members.
The person most responsible for ushering the treatment activists into
the decision-making processes of the federal government was Dr. Anthony
Fauci, the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) within NIH. An articulate AIDS expert with a Brooklyn
accent, Fauci had no direct authority over FDA policies. Nonetheless,
NIAID’s function as the chief overseer and funder of AIDS drug
investigations around the country made him an extremely influential figure
on the issue of access to unapproved therapies.
Fauci initially opposed extensive pre-approval use of AIDS drugs for
treatment, fearing it would deter participation in clinical trials. He changed
his mind, however, both because of his growing distress over the plight of
dying PWAs and because AIDS activists persuaded him that clinical
research would survive, and perhaps even improve, if accompanied by
treatment access. 198 After meeting Martin Delaney in spring 1989, Fauci
instructed an assistant to begin sketching out an early access program with
the Californian. 199 Following the Montreal conference, Fauci invited some
ACT UP T&D Committee members to NIH to discuss their plan. 200 Days
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later, on June 23, 1989, Fauci delivered a speech in San Francisco outlining
a new program, titled Parallel Track, that would make unapproved AIDS
drugs available for treatment use as soon as they were proved safe, even as
clinical trials were ongoing. 201 Although he presented this proposal as his
own initiative, the NIAID chief acknowledged that it resulted from
“constructive pressure” from AIDS advocacy groups. 202 In fact, the AIDS
activist community deserves most of the credit for the idea. 203
Fauci did not confer with the FDA or HHS before delivering this
speech—a striking lapse, in view of the fact that the FDA, not NIAID,
would be responsible for designing and implementing any parallel track
mechanism. FDA Commissioner Young quickly insisted, “I’ve been
pushing [parallel track] as much as Tony has”—and then commenced the
difficult work of putting flesh on Fauci’s skeletal proposal. 204 As one
scholar remarked: “Overnight, Fauci became the hero of the activist
community and … made the [FDA] regulators into the stumbling block to
reform.” 205
B. Congressional Hearing
Less than a month later, Young and James Mason, the HHS Assistant
Secretary in charge of the National AIDS Program, were sitting beside
Fauci on Capitol Hill, defending his parallel track proposal before a House
subcommittee. 206 The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment was
chaired by Congressman Henry Waxman, a traditional consumer protection
advocate who had opened the proceedings by emphasizing the FDCA’s
critical role of “protect[ing] consumers from dangerous products and from
snake oil remedies” and by defending the morality of imposing “a policy of
limited distribution today, so that we will have adequate information for
tomorrow.” 207
The panel of government witnesses explained that the proposed parallel
track program (which was limited to AIDS and HIV drugs) would provide
access to experimental medications much earlier than the Treatment IND—
“at the earliest possible stage” of their clinical development, namely, after
201
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the completion of phase 1 trials. 208 In response to Waxman’s suggestion that
the proposal was “an opening for laetrile,” Mason assured the congressman
that the program would be limited to drugs that showed “some promise” of
efficacy—either in animal experimentation or in phase I. 209 The panel
expressed confidence that the existence of a parallel track would not
undermine clinical trials by discouraging participation in them. Mason
pointed out that because AIDS trials now used AZT rather than a placebo as
a control, potential clinical trial subjects did not have to fear that they would
go entirely untreated in a controlled study. 210 Fauci emphasized that because
only PWAs unable to participate in a clinical trial were eligible for the
parallel track, nobody could choose the parallel track instead of a controlled
study, in any event. 211
In his testimony, Martin Delaney took issue with Fauci’s proposal to
make the parallel track off-limits to anyone eligible and able to participate
in a clinical trial. He opined that policymakers were still too concerned with
preserving the integrity of the clinical trial process and too little concerned
with protecting PWAs’ medical autonomy. “Research outcomes are not the
only objective of what we’re trying to accomplish here, and there’s a broad
enough pool of patients here that we can give a degree of choice to those
who are at the most near-term risk of losing their own lives. We think
choice has to be given to those people.” 212 Interestingly, Jim Eigo of ACT
UP did not similarly emphasize choice when he testified. He instead agreed
with Fauci that the parallel track should be open only to those who could
not participate in a clinical trial.
Delaney and Eigo fully agreed on one critical point, however—that
PWAs should play a central role in the implementation of any parallel track
program. Delaney was skeptical that FDA staffers, focused on the ultimate
approval of drugs, would adequately consider PWAs’ desire for therapies
prior to approval. He thus insisted that the parallel track program be
administered by an independent standing committee that included patients
and their advocates. 213 Eigo similarly urged that community representatives
be involved, noting: “The AIDS establishment can learn from those who
have been dealing with this disease daily for nearly a decade now.” 214
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C. Advisory Committee Meeting

Following the congressional hearing, Young convened an FDA
advisory committee (a body of outside experts) to help resolve the complex
issues surrounding parallel track. 215 The resulting August 17, 1989 meeting
of FDA’s Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Committee in Bethesda, Maryland
was an extraordinary event. 216 Traditionally, advisory committee meetings
had been the exclusive domain of government bureaucrats, scientists,
industry representatives, and, sometimes, members of established consumer
protection groups. In this meeting, AIDS activists played a prominent—
even dominant—role. The FDA, sensing the shifting political dynamics,
invited Delaney, Eigo, and several other AIDS activists to testify. About ten
additional activists and patients took the microphone during the open public
hearing. ACT UP bused in members to fill the spectators’ seats. The result
was a departure from the normally staid atmosphere of such events; the
highly engaged audience punctuated the proceedings with applause and
laughter dozens of times. The activists thus established an important
precedent for extensive patient involvement in advisory committee
meetings.
The start of the meeting resembled the Congressional hearing of the
previous month, with Mason, Young, and Fauci speaking favorably but
guardedly about the creation of a parallel track program. Next, Delaney and
Eigo emphasized the burning need for such a program and urged that
community members be afforded a central role in its design and
implementation. 217 Delaney and Eigo both contended that PWAs with no
treatment alternatives had a “right” to take an informed risk on an
experimental drug, and they both explicitly rejected the notion that currently
infected individuals should make a “sacrifice” for the future greater good. 218
Indeed, Eigo moved closer to Delaney’s position on absolute choice by
arguing that the “AZT recalcitrant”—that is, people with a “personal
animosity” toward that drug—should be considered “unable” to participate
in clinical trials with an AZT control and thus entitled to opt for the parallel
track. 219 Still, a subtle difference remained between the two men’s views,
representing a growing East Coast/West Coast divide among AIDS
treatment activists. Eigo stressed the importance of obtaining “real world”
safety and efficacy information from the parallel track. Delaney, by
contrast, favored limiting mandatory data collection in the parallel track to
215
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information required to safeguard patients. He worried that significant
paperwork requirements would “choke the system” and discourage
participation by community doctors. Delaney insisted that “the objective of
parallel track is not to conduct research. It is to provide treatment.” 220
The eloquent and passionate testimony of community representatives
that followed heightened the feeling of urgency and highlighted the national
scope of the movement. The right to choose was a recurring refrain. For
example, Michelle Roland of ACT UP San Francisco endorsed Fauci’s
parallel track proposal only ambivalently because it did not address the
“bottom line issue of patient choice.” She warned that her organization
would continue to agitate until all AIDS patients had “the right to choose to
use an experimental therapy once it has been shown to be reasonably safe
and there is some indication of efficacy.” 221 Various speakers reiterated
Delaney’s assertion that data collection requirements should not be allowed
to interfere with the parallel track’s treatment goals. 222 Jeff Levi of the Gay
Men’s Health Crisis reaffirmed the critical importance of ongoing PWA
involvement in the administration of the program. 223 Larry Kramer,
predictably, provided a fiery coda:
If we do not get these drugs you will see an uprising, the likes of which
you have never seen before since the Vietnam War in this country. We will
sabotage all of your Phase II studies. We will continue to get our drugs on the
underground. Our chemists will duplicate your formulas…. 224

Meanwhile, the testimony of two traditional consumer advocates
highlighted how far many of the AIDS activists had diverged from the
consumer protection movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Sidney Wolfe
remarked: “With the shift of power from industry, from researchers, from
FDA to include in a much more important way patients comes
responsibility as well.” He then scolded Eigo and Delaney for taking a
position that “would undermine … controlled trials.” 225 William Schultz of
the Public Citizen Litigation Group similarly emphasized the tension
between early access and the quest for scientific truth:
… It seems to me that … we are striving … to make possibly effective
drugs available to the widest number of people as early as possible.
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If in doing that, it turns out that we are slowing down clinical trials and
impeding them, to me, the advantage of actually having some treatment—it
may make doctors feel good; it may make patients feel good, but if it is not
doing any good, if it is not curing anybody and if it is slowing down clinical
trials, I am against it. 226

The advisory committee meeting ended with one looming quandary
unsolved: the parallel track program would not help a single PWA if
pharmaceutical manufacturers declined to participate in it. Drug companies
had various reasons to shun parallel track, including fear of product liability
lawsuits, interference with the controlled trials that would form the basis for
ultimate approval, and the prohibition against charging an amount higher
than needed for cost recovery. HHS Assistant Secretary Mason nonetheless
expressed blithe assurance that manufacturers would participate
enthusiastically because of the good will and publicity they would get from
doing so. 227 Eigo, too, suggested that companies would eagerly take part in
parallel track—without charging patients—once they realized that “the
short-term economic loss of paying for [the] drug will be outweighed by the
long-term gain of short trials, clean data, … good community relations and
some free publicity.” 228
Some were less confident, however. ACT UP’s Mark Harrington—
always intensely skeptical about the industry’s motives—doubted that the
AIDS community could count on its voluntary participation and advocated
government coercion.
I question a parallel track program that would rely exclusively on the
voluntary involvement of pharmaceutical companies. Are we not in a war? If
we were fighting a foreign enemy, the government would be issuing massive
contracts and compelling large manufacturers to provide war materiel. In the
war on AIDS new treatments are war materiel. 229

A few speakers more modestly suggested conditioning NIH funding or
ultimate FDA approval on an agreement by the manufacturer to create and
fund a parallel track. 230
By the end of this August 1989 advisory committee meeting, the
parallel track idea had unstoppable momentum. Indeed, the agency was
already on the verge of allowing treatment access following Phase I trials to
dideoxyinosine (ddI), an antiretroviral product without AZT’s severe
226
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toxicity. 231 In September—after negotiations between the FDA, NIH,
Bristol-Meyers (ddI’s manufacturer), and AIDS activists—the secretary of
HHS announced a treatment IND for ddI with a protocol that bore all the
marks of a parallel track program. 232
D. The Policy
In May 1990, the FDA published a proposed policy statement setting
forth the parallel track mechanism. 233 The policy applied only to individuals
with AIDS or HIV-related diseases, although the agency expressed a
willingness to consider expanding the program to other life-threatening
diseases later. 234 The proposal limited patient choice and prioritized the
pursuit of data more than Delaney, and perhaps Eigo, would have preferred.
The parallel track was open only to patients who could not tolerate AZT or
for whom AZT was contraindicated or demonstrably did not work. 235
Moreover, the FDA emphasized the importance of including “sufficient
safeguards and oversight to ensure that [the parallel track] neither delays
nor compromises the controlled clinical trials.” 236 Accordingly, the
proposed policy did not allow patients to join the parallel track if they were
eligible for a controlled study in which they could realistically participate. 237
Finally, the proposal emphatically required physicians participating in the
parallel track procedure to collect and report safety data, and sometimes
efficacy data. 238
Despite these conditions, the creation of parallel track was an
indisputable triumph for the AIDS activists. It allowed PWAs who satisfied
the eligibility requirements to try an unapproved drug at a very early point
in its development, when evidence of efficacy was little more than
suggestive. The activists also prevailed in their demand that the AIDS
community play a role in administering parallel track; under the policy, the
231
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FDA would presumptively refer all parallel track proposals to the AIDS
Research Advisory Committee (ARAC), a committee chartered by NIAID
that included PWAs as well as scientists and physicians. 239 Although the
1990 document was only a proposed policy statement, the fact that the FDA
had already authorized the release of ddI under a parallel-track-like protocol
suggested that the agency was committed to the concept.
If there was any doubt that the FDA would ultimately finalize the
policy, it disappeared a few months later, when the Lasagna Committee
endorsed a parallel track for AIDS and cancer drugs in its final report. 240
Although the report stated that parallel track protocols should be permitted
only when “there is assurance that adequate clinical trials are in progress
and will not be compromised,” it then declared that “the committee supports
the rights of patients to obtain investigational drugs under these
circumstances. Faced with the consequences of a lack of therapy for AIDS
and cancer, an expanded mechanism for early access to investigational
drugs is morally, ethically, and scientifically justified.” 241 The committee
remarked: “[A]lthough [earlier access] will clearly present greater risks to
patients, because some of the drugs may eventually be found either to be
ineffective or to present an unacceptable benefit/risk ratio, patients with
life-threatening diseases who have no alternative therapy are entitled to
make this choice.” 242 Not coincidently, the report also praised the FDA’s
recent responsiveness to patient advocacy groups. 243
In April 1992, the FDA published its final parallel track policy
statement, which remained essentially unchanged from the proposal. 244
Once again, the interests of AIDS activists and Republican deregulators had
aligned.
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VIII. SCHISM: THE TREATMENT ACTIVISTS BREAK AWAY
Despite its success with parallel track, the AIDS activist community
was coming apart at the seams. Around 1990, it started dividing into two
indistinct and overlapping but nonetheless identifiable camps. On one side
were the “treatment activists,” primarily middle-class, white, HIV-positive
gay males who prioritized, above all, the goal of getting “drugs into
bodies.” They increasingly clashed with the “social activists,” a group
composed largely of women (especially lesbian, HIV-negative women) and
people of color (many of them gay and HIV-positive). The social activists
embraced a mission much broader than the development and approval of
AIDS drugs. They advocated social services for PWAs and equal access to
health care, and they demanded that the government pay special attention to
the particular challenges confronted by HIV-infected women, AfricanAmericans, and Latinos. 245
The conflict was particularly bitter within ACT UP/NY, where
members of the Treatment and Data Committee feuded with the Women’s
Caucus. The Caucus mobilized ACT UP to challenge a Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) definition of AIDS that excluded many
infected women; T&D viewed such efforts as diversions from ACT UP’s
primary objective of promoting the development and release of
pharmaceuticals. The Caucus also protested an NIH placebo-controlled trial
designed to determine whether AZT could reduce the transmission of HIV
from mothers to infants during pregnancy, contending that the study
privileged fetuses’ health over women’s. T&D members generally
supported this (ultimately successful) study and were enraged by the
Caucus’s disruption of a Newark community meeting led by the principal
investigator. 246
The most contentious issue of all was an early 1991 proposal by Tracy
Morgan, a Women’s Caucus leader, that ACT UP conduct a six-month
moratorium on meetings with government officials. 247 Moratorium
proponents believed that T&D members were being corrupted by their
increasingly cooperative relationships with the federal AIDS bureaucracy.
T&D activists, pleased by their hard-won access to government decisionmakers, responded to the proposal with horror. David Barr, an HIV-positive
treatment activist, scolded Morgan: “You know, what you’re saying would
245
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kill me.” 248 The ACT UP membership voted down the moratorium, but the
controversy added to T&D’s sense of exasperation and alienation. In
January 1992, the T&D leadership split off from ACT UP and formed the
Treatment Action Group (TAG), an independent nonprofit organization
with invitation-only membership devoted exclusively to speeding the
development and availability of AIDS therapies.
The TAG secession is the episode that ACT UP veterans are usually
referring to today when they mention the “schism.” But within a couple of
years, an equally significant breach opened up within the treatment
community itself. The fault line was the inherent tension, discussed above,
between freedom of choice and the pursuit of medical truth. The issue that
triggered the rupture was a new mechanism called accelerated approval.
IX. THE INTERNECINE BATTLE OVER ACCELERATED APPROVAL
A. Birth of the Procedure
Whereas the parallel track program made drugs available prior to FDA
approval, accelerated approval—promulgated by the agency as a final rule
in 1992—hastened the actual approval of drugs for life-threatening diseases.
It authorized approval of an NDA before the acquisition of any concrete
evidence that the drug actually lengthened survival. Instead, accelerated
approval was based on studies (frequently phase 2 studies) demonstrating
the product’s effect on an unvalidated “surrogate endpoint”—a laboratory
measurement reasonably likely, but not certain, to correlate with clinical
benefit. 249
Accelerated approval was another product of the unusual alliance
between AIDS activists and Republican deregulators. In 1990, to the
frustration of many, AZT, a nucleoside analog, remained the only FDAapproved drug intended to suppress the HIV virus itself. The August 1990
final report of the Lasagna Committee urged the agency to “exercise its
statutory and administrative flexibility to approve AIDS and cancer drugs
for marketing at the earliest possible point in their development” and, in
particular, to make progress “in approving drugs on the basis of surrogate
endpoints.” 250 Several months later, a coalition of San Francisco-based
AIDS activists petitioned the FDA to quickly review NDAs for two newer
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nucleoside analogs, ddI and ddC, and consider approving them based on
surrogate endpoints rather than improved survival. 251
On October 9, 1991, before the completion of phase 2 clinical trials, the
FDA approved ddI for patients not helped by AZT. The parallel-track-like
program implemented by Bristol-Meyers in 1989, discussed above, 252 had
made ddI available to about 23,000 patients and generated important safety
data. No evidence yet existed, however, that ddI actually extended the lives
of PWAs. Nonetheless, the FDA approved it “conditionally” based on
preliminary results showing an increase in patients’ T-4 cells (signaling a
strengthening of the immune system). The agency said it would revisit the
approval when the clinical trial was finished. 253 Thus was born the
procedure that would soon be called “accelerated approval.”
The accelerated approval of ddI changed the rules of the drug’s
distribution in critical ways, compared to parallel track. For example, it
would now be available to all PWAs, not just those who satisfied the
parallel track’s protocol. Moreover, Bristol-Meyers would now be permitted
to sell the drug at a profit. Under parallel track, the company had been
providing ddI to patients free, foregoing the cost-recovery price the FDA
might have allowed it to charge. Now, the retail price of the product would
be about $2,000 per year. Accelerated approval thus gave the company a
financial incentive to maximize the drug’s distribution. But who would pay
for the medication? Insurance drug plans rarely covered experimental
treatments outside the cancer area, but they virtually always covered FDAapproved products. The day of ddI’s approval, David Kessler, the FDA
Commissioner, clarified that accelerated approval was no different from
traditional drug approval in this respect. He “expected government and
private insurers to pay for ddI like any other F.D.A.-approved drug.” 254
Despite ddI’s high price, it would thus be available to potentially hundreds
of thousands of individuals under Medicaid and some private insurance
plans. Bristol-Meyers pledged to provide ddI free to low-income PWAs
who did not qualify for Medicaid. The drug’s accelerated approval was thus
news that both industry and patient advocates could cheer.
The deregulators within the Bush administration were pleased as well.
When Bush took office, the task of overseeing systemic deregulation passed
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to a new body called the Council on Competitiveness, chaired by Vice
President Dan Quayle. 255 By explicitly inviting lobbyists for regulated
industries to suggest rules that should be amended or repealed, Quayle left
little doubt that the Council was motivated by a desire to help business, not
by an abstract devotion to limited government. 256 In November 1990,
Quayle established, under the aegis of the Council, a Working Group on the
Drug Approval Process and charged it with reviewing the Lasagna
Report. 257 A year later, one month following ddI’s approval, the Council
endorsed the approval of drugs prior to phase 3 testing based on surrogate
evidence of effectiveness, accompanied by sponsor commitments to
conduct post-marketing studies. 258
As noted previously, pharmaceutical companies were ambivalent at
best about parallel track, largely because of the program’s limitations on
charging. By contrast, they were undoubtedly thrilled at the prospect of
selling drugs for a profit earlier than usual (and with less evidence of
clinical efficacy) pursuant to accelerated approval. The industry did not
initially take the lead role in promoting accelerated approval, however,
perhaps because it calculated that the procedure would be far less
controversial if championed by those who demanded it solely for public
health and humanitarian reasons.
On April 15, 1992 (the same day it issued its final parallel track policy
statement), the FDA published a proposed rule establishing accelerated
approval for drugs intended to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses. 259
The rule stated: “FDA may grant marketing approval for a new drug
product on the basis of adequate and well-controlled clinical trials
establishing that the drug product has an effect on a surrogate endpoint that
is reasonably likely … to predict clinical benefit…. Such approval will be
subject to the requirement that the applicant study the drug further … to
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verify and describe its clinical benefit.” 260 The proposal created expedited
withdrawal procedures for drugs approved under the rule if the follow-up
studies were not performed or failed to verify clinical benefit. 261
In June 1992, even though the rule was not yet finalized, the FDA used
the procedure to approve ddC, a third nucleoside analog. The agency
approved the drug for combination use with AZT based on two small
studies showing an increase in the number of CD4 T cells in the immune
system. This time, the FDA did not even have safety data from a parallel
use program—Hoffmann-La Roche, ddC’s manufacturer, had refused to
establish one. The company immediately announced that ddC’s annual
wholesale price would be $1,826. 262
In December 1992, the FDA issued the final accelerated approval rule
without significant revisions. 263
B. TAG’s Misgivings
Despite widespread satisfaction in the AIDS movement, some
treatment-focused activists were uneasy about accelerated approval. As a
member of the advisory committee considering ddC in 1992, Mark
Harrington doubted that it had any clinical benefit. He voted in favor of
accelerated approval of the drug anyway, because he felt bound to follow
the majority sentiment of his community. 264 Later, as Hoffmann-La Roche
failed to complete the confirmatory studies it had promised, Harrington and
some of his TAG colleagues increasingly regretted his “yes” vote. These
East Coast activists began to feel that “the AIDS community, in its
understandable desperation, was being manipulated by industry to demand
the expeditious approval of inadequately tested drugs.” 265 TAG was
becoming exasperated by “the access-obsession of other community
activists, who no longer seemed to think drugs were worth studying once
they were on the market, and yet who clamored endlessly for access to
drugs in the early stages of testing.” 266
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Two years later, when the advisory committee considered accelerated
approval of d4T, another nucleoside analogue, Harrington’s seat had been
inherited by his TAG colleague Gregg Gonsalves, a thirty-year-old, HIVpositive Tufts dropout. Gonsalves voted “no” on D4T, although the
committee as a whole recommended approval and the FDA followed the
majority’s advice. 267 Enraged by Gonsalves’ vote, other AIDS activists
launched vicious attacks at him and TAG. A pamphlet circulated at an ACT
UP/NY meeting sarcastically urged: “JOIN TAG TODAY. Speak as a
‘community representative’ while destroying everything AIDS activists
have fought and died for! Be a conservative nihilist and … be … self-hating
and GENOCIDAL.” 268
The rancor would soon intensify. In 1994, PWAs were vesting great
hope in a new class of antiviral drugs called protease inhibitors. In May,
Hoffmann-La Roche announced the results of a small, short-term phase 2
trial of one of these drugs, saquinavir. The study showed that a triple
combination of AZT, ddC, and saquinavir had a modestly positive effect on
CD4 cell counts. 269 On June 16, four TAG members (including Harrington
and Gonsalves), along with representatives of three other AIDS
organizations, sent FDA Commissioner Kessler a letter pleading that the
FDA not grant accelerated approval to saquinavir. The letter’s authors
explained: “[W]e believe that people with AIDS are entitled to information
about new therapies that is sufficient to make necessary risk/benefit
analyses regarding their treatment.” Accelerated approval of saquinavir,
they argued,
would penalize people with AIDS/HIV by setting an inappropriately low
standard of evidential requirements that would govern the regulation of this
entire class of therapies…. Saquinavir … is not yet an appropriate candidate
for an accelerated NDA because it has not been studied for safety in a broad
enough patient population for a long enough time … and because the use of
surrogate markers to evaluate potential efficacy … is completely untested in
this class of therapies. 270

The TAG letter further contended that accelerated approval of
saquinavir would ensure that nobody would ever perform the studies
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necessary to determine whether the drug had any clinical benefit. “We have
learned through difficult experience that [after approval] we cannot depend
on the goodwill of pharmaceutical industry sponsors to produce the
information that is necessary to make life or death treatment decisions.” As
an alternative to accelerated approval, the authors urged the commencement
of a pre-approval 3-arm “large simple trial” (LST) comparing two doses of
saquinavir to placebo in a total of 18,000 patients. 271 (An LST is a study
with an unusually large sample size, broad eligibility criteria, multiple sites,
and a simplified method of data collection.) This approach, they argued,
would provide information on actual clinical outcomes.
The TAG representatives who signed this letter did not consult with
their former comrades in ACT UP beforehand. When ACT UP’s
membership learned about the letter, it responded with fury. In a
tempestuous weekly meeting, one member observed that accelerated
approval “is something we’ve been fighting hard and long for. We’ve been
arrested to get accelerated approval through.” A female activist roared: “I
am not interested in mud-wrestling with the boys. I am absolutely enraged
that there are people who have appointed themselves elitist representatives
and represent themselves as the single voice of this epidemic… I’m going
to fight them…. You goddamn well better fight them!” 272
C. Advisory Committee Meeting
In September 1994, the FDA Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee
tackled the question of accelerated approval. The list of witnesses at the
meeting included not only FDA officials and AIDS advocates, but also two
representatives of pharmaceutical companies, who, unsurprisingly, offered
positive reviews of the utilization of the accelerated approval procedure on
their products. 273
As Mark Harrington recalled, the meeting was a “circus.” 274 Scores of
activists hooted, hollered, applauded, and harangued the participants.
Strikingly, they directed their vitriol not at government bureaucrats or
pharmaceutical industry officials, but at other AIDS activists—TAG
members. The first day of the meeting ended with Gonsalves charging
271
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Martin Delaney with not “telling the truth to people with HIV” and with
launching “cheap personal crap” at him and his allies.” 275
The TAG witnesses tried, with little success, to assuage their
opponents’ anger. They insisted that they supported the accelerated
approval procedure in principle, even though they opposed its use for
saquinavir. They also corrected the widespread misconception that under
TAG’s proposal, saquinavir would be available only through the controlled
large simple trial, emphasizing that they supported the simultaneous
establishment of a parallel track for treatment. The anti-TAG camp
responded that this parallel track (which the TAG letter to Kessler
unfortunately termed a “salvage protocol”) would be open only to patients
who met specified criteria, such as a drop of CD4 cells to grave levels.
PWAs who did not meet these criteria would be forced into the LST, with a
one-in-three chance of receiving a sugar pill instead of saquinavir.
The proposed use of a placebo arm in the LST was particularly
infuriating to many of TAG’s foes. The community had long passionately
resisted the use of placebos in clinical trials for AIDS drugs. 276 Indeed,
Harrington himself had once described the use of placebo controls as “a
shameful legacy … of excluding people from access to experimental
treatments … [which] stretches [back to] the Tuskegee syphilis experiment
of the 1930s.” 277 Now, TAG representatives assured their opponents that
none of the participants in their proposed saquinavir LST would—like the
African-American subjects in the notorious Tuskegee trial—go untreated.
Instead, all participants would be permitted concomitantly to take any other
medications they wanted (besides protease inhibitors). 278 This did not
mollify the anti-TAG forces, however. Martin Delaney explained: “We just
don’t believe you can put people on a placebo ethically in this disease at
this point, even if it’s a placebo of the new agent while continuing old mono
therapy arms or standard regimens.” 279 Mark King, of the Atlanta mayor’s
Task Force on AIDS bluntly declared: “Any trial featuring a placebo is an
inhumane way to treat someone counting on a potentially lifesaving
drug.” 280
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In sum, TAG’s foes demanded that PWAs have absolute autonomy to
choose their desired treatments. They invoked the ideal of “personal choice”
repeatedly, often elevating it into a quasi-constitutional principle. Brenda
Freiburg, the president of a Los Angeles group called Research Access,
asserted: “I firmly believe that individuals have a basic inalienable right to
choose their own treatments.” 281 Greg Haas of the Committee of Ten
Thousand insisted that people with life-threatening illnesses have a
“fundamental right” to choose their therapies, and Michael Onstott of ACT
UP/San Francisco termed it an “absolute right.” 282 Fred Schaich,
representing various Florida AIDS groups, declared: “Our country is based
on freedoms. Every PWA should be permitted the freedom to enter a clinic,
request a list of AIDS treatment options to combat the HIV virus and make
an individual choice.” 283
TAG and its supporters minimized the value of therapeutic choice in
the absence of scientific evidence of efficacy. 284 TAG member Spencer Cox
testified: “With no reliable information about treatment effects, one
sometimes has to make a treatment guess. But this is not an act of reason.
This is an act of desperation.” 285 TAG demanded only a “right to make
rational treatment decisions.” 286 Its opponents, by contrast, insisted that
desperately ill patients had a right to make therapeutic guesses. ACT UP’s
281
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282
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Bill Bahlman challenged TAG’s Cox: “Haven’t you realized from your own
experience that people respond very differently from [sic] individual drugs
and … that personal choices and people making decisions for themselves is
paramount[?]”287 Delaney similarly contended: “No clinical trial, no number
of clinical trials will ever predict what a drug is going to do in a single
individual person. … [I]n the end it is still in every individual case between
the doctor and a patient a degree of try it and see what happens.” 288 Some
witnesses emphasized the value of hope in and of itself. For example, HIVpositive Brie Salzman of the PWA Coalition of New York told the advisory
committee that regardless of whether FDA’s early access programs had
extended her life, they “have given me hope. And that’s really, really
tremendously important … certainly more important to me than any
mountain of hard data.” 289
Finally, TAG and its adversaries clashed over accelerated approval’s
impact on research. In TAG’s view, premature accelerated approval would
not only allow PWAs to make uninformed choices, but also undermine the
possibility of ever obtaining the evidence necessary for patients to make
informed ones. The TAG camp cynically doubted that Hoffman-La Roche
would ever perform the post-approval studies required to determine if
saquinavir offered any clinical benefit. Citing the same company’s failure to
complete the trials it had promised to conduct following the accelerated
approval of ddC, 290 Harrington asserted that the AIDS community could not
“depend on the good will of pharmaceutical industry sponsors.” 291 The TAG
witnesses further argued that in the absence of voluntary compliance, FDA
did not have regulatory tools sufficient to compel sponsors to live up to their
post-approval research commitments. The threat of expedited withdrawal of
the NDA was of little practical use. Recalling the ddC episode, activist
Carlton Hogan observed: “Roche didn’t do the trial; what were you [FDA]
going to do, pull the drug and take everybody in the country off it? No.” 292
In short, TAG and its allies believed that granting accelerated approval
to saquinavir would inappropriately sacrifice the public benefits of scientific
knowledge on the altar of personal choice. Cox expounded: “It’s easy to
construct a rationale allowing patients who are presently ill to make these
terrible choices. It’s less easy to construct a rationale for committing

287

Id. at II-45 (Bahlman).
Id. at 1–379.
289
Id. at II-17.
290
The company’s failure to complete these trials was less clearly blameworthy than
TAG suggested. See discussion of ddC’s post-approval clinical program at id. 136–52.
291
Id. at I-292 (Harrington); II-36-8, 41 (Cox); II-42 (Gonsalves), II-142 (Link).
292
Id. at 1–108 (Hogan).; Letter (June 16, 1994), in Harrington, supra note 266 at 14.
288

61

America’s Drug Constitution

62

patients who will be ill in five years to the same kind of ignorance.” 293
Dennis Davidson, an unaffiliated HIV-positive witness, similarly opined:
… [T]he notion that every citizen with HIV has a right to access new and
reasonably safe therapies that show some promise of efficacy, however
meager or ambiguous, is certainly appealing, given the cult of individuality
which the American culture has so efficiently enshrined. It almost seems
patriotic.
However, new and perhaps more informative clinical trials, should they
be held hostage to this demand[?]….
… [P]erhaps the time has come to defer hypothetical benefit often
couched in terms of rights of access to a … long-term benefit for all of us.
… It may be harsh to frame this debate in terms of selfish individualism
versus altruism, but demanding access for individuals without ensuring a
process to benefit the group, becomes just that. 294

Although some of TAG’s opponents emphasized that sufficient data
could be collected in clinical trials following accelerated approval, 295 at
bottom they appeared to believed that if there was an irresolvable conflict
between knowledge and access, the latter should prevail. Brenda Freiburg
testified: “[T]he acquisition of more meaningful data is very important, but
saving lives should always be our number one priority.” 296
As the advisory committee meeting drew to a close, the head of the
FDA’s Division of Antiviral Drugs remarked, “I can’t recall a meeting with
as broad representation and as much useful public commentary.” 297 He gave
no hint, however, as to whose approach would ultimately triumph—that of
the TAG activists, who struggled to reconcile therapeutic choice with the
acquisition of medical truth, or that of their rivals within the movement,
who insisted that in the face of a dreadful malady like AIDS, patient
autonomy trumped all other concerns.
In the end, the two sides fought to something of a draw. TAG’s
intervention doubtless had some impact. Even before the hearing had
commenced, Hoffmann-La Roche had agreed to postpone its request for
accelerated approval of saquinavir until the company performed an interim
analysis of surrogate endpoint data from an ongoing phase III trial. 298 TAG
would take credit for this delay, as well as for the company’s establishment
of a parallel track program to accompany the trial. 299 Nevertheless, the FDA
293
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did not otherwise embrace TAG’s proposal. The agency granted saquinavir
accelerated approval on December 7, 1995, fifteen months after the hearing,
without demanding the commencement of an LST, let alone the
presentation of data suggesting the drug’s clinical efficacy. 300 Spencer Cox
of TAG ascribed this action to “Corporate Cynicism, Savvy Schmoozing,
and Relentless PR.” 301
CONCLUSION: LEGACY
By the turn of the millennium, the AIDS movement lost much of its
vitality and visibility. Although internal divisions probably contributed to
this decline, the primary reason was a much happier one: in 1996 and 1997,
the FDA approved three additional protease inhibitors, all superior to
saquinavir. These drugs became essential components in the cocktail
therapies that made AIDS what it is for many patients today—a manageable
chronic disease. 302
Considered as a whole, the AIDS movement’s FDA campaign was
remarkably successful at instilling its shared goals and assumptions into
America’s “drug constitution.” In their analysis of “administrative
constitutionalism,” Eskridge and Ferejohn emphasize that agencies’ normgenerating actions are not the final word, but rather “trial balloons” subject
to embrace or veto by Congress and other government actors. 303 In
accordance with this model, the impact of AIDS activism is now clearly
visible in the FDCA itself. The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) added FDCA § 506, which expedites
the approval of drugs for serious and life-threatening conditions. 304 This
section partly codifies the FDA’s 1988 Subpart E regulations (under the
name “Fast Track”) and also includes a liberalized version of the 1992
Accelerated Approval rule. 305 In the Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA), Congress revised section 506 to
expand the eligibility for and advantages of Fast Track, to create a new
expedited approval mechanism called “Breakthrough Therapy,” and to grant
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the FDA greater flexibility and discretion to use accelerated approval for
drugs intended to treat serious conditions. 306
In addition, the FDCA now explicitly allows pre-approval treatment
access. Section 561, also added by FDAMA in 1997, codifies the FDA’s
1987 treatment IND rule as well the agency’s longtime practice of granting
access to individual patients. 307 In 2009, the agency revised the treatment
IND rule itself to state that the evidence necessary to support widespread
use of an investigational therapy for an immediately life-threatening disease
will “ordinarily consist of clinical data from phase 3 or phase 2 trials, but
could be based on more preliminary clinical evidence.” 308 This regulation
thus now effectively incorporates parallel track and its lower evidentiary
standard into the treatment IND regime.
The AIDS community also forged a widely-used model for direct
involvement in FDA decision-making. Today, groups representing people
with all sorts of diseases regularly seek to sway FDA drug approval
decisions. Some of these organizations receive funding from the
pharmaceutical industry, but many do not. 309 Advisory committee meetings
are frequently crowded with patients, some of whom offer impassioned
testimony. Moreover, thanks to the AIDS movement’s efforts, patient
representatives are now entrenched in the advisory committees themselves.
In 1991, in response to demands of AIDS advocates, the FDA created a
position for a Patient Representative on the Antiviral Drugs Advisory
Committee for HIV. 310 Cancer patient groups soon requested similar
representation. In 1996, the Clinton Administration provided that each FDA
advisory committee reviewing a cancer-related therapy should include a
patient representative “with experience in the specific malignancy” at
issue. 311 Shortly afterward, the FDA announced that these representatives
306
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would have full voting privileges. 312 Now, patient representatives are voting
members of a broad array of advisory committees considering drugs for
many diseases.
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012
demonstrates how the patient-centered ethos of the AIDS movement
continues to shape federal drug regulation. FDASIA added a new section
569C to the FDCA, titled “Patient Participation in Medical Product
Discussion.” 313 This provision obligates the FDA to “develop and
implement strategies to solicit the views of patients during the medical
product development process and consider the perspectives of patients
during regulatory discussions.” 314 To this end, it specifically instructs the
FDA to encourage the participation of patient representatives, as “special
government employees,” in agency meetings with the sponsors of drug,
device, and biologic applications. 315
Another portion of FDASIA, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA V), binds the FDA to detailed performance goals for 2013 through
2017, set forth in a separate document. 316 These goals, which are part of a
broader agency initiative called “Patient-Focused Drug Development,”
promise to move patients ever closer to the center of federal drug
regulation. 317 The FDA commits not only to increasing its use of patient
representatives in regulatory discussions about specific products, but also to
holding four meetings per year with patient advocates regarding various
disease areas—a number exceeded in both 2014 and 2015. 318
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These initiatives enhancing patient involvement in drug development
and approval are linked to a general understanding that victims of serious
diseases generally demand freedom to assume greater risks for more
uncertain benefits. As the FDA explained when announcing the
commencement of its regular meetings with patient advocates: “A key part
of regulatory decisionmaking is establishing the context in which the
particular decision is made…. Patients who live with a disease have a direct
stake in the outcome of the review process and are in a unique position to
contribute to weighing benefit-risk considerations that can occur throughout
the medical product development process. 319 This reassessment of the riskbenefit calculation, and who should make it, is also a legacy of the AIDS
activists. Moreover, due largely to the AIDS movement’s efforts, the FDA’s
view of its very mission has evolved. It now embraces the task not only of
protecting the public health by preventing the sale of dangerous products,
but also of enhancing the public health by ensuring access to potentially
useful remedies. 320 Congress codified this expanded mission in the FDCA
itself in 1997. 321
To what extent have these developments actually led to the earlier
availability of drugs for severely ill individuals? When answering this
question, we must distinguish between post-approval and pre-approval
access. The AIDS activists’ impact is more obvious with respect to the
former, doubtless in part because the pharmaceutical industry itself is fond
of accelerated approval (and the profits it generates). Accelerated approval
has now been an effective program for almost a quarter of a century. In the
years immediately following the mechanism’s 1992 creation, the FDA used
it almost exclusively for AIDS therapies, including saquinavir and the three
additional protease inhibitors mentioned above. 322 Starting in the late 1990s,
under pressure from patient groups, the agency began using the procedure
more frequently for drugs for cancer and other diseases. Today, more than
90 drugs have been approved under the accelerated approval system,
approximately one-third for AIDS, one-third for cancer, and one-third for
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other illnesses. 323 The activists’ influence (in conjunction with industry’s)
can also been seen in the common use and general success of other
programs designed to speed the development, review, and approval of drugs
addressing serious unmet needs, including the “fast track” and new
“breakthrough therapy” designations. 324
TAG’s calls for caution have also had a permanent impact, however.
The FDA has never used accelerated approval as frequently as the more
fervent advocates of the procedure would like. As early as 1996, an article
observed that TAG and its allies have “found the FDA to be an attentive
audience” to their objections about “flooding the market with unproven
‘remedies.’” 325 In the view of one scholar, whenever the FDA has yielded to
demands to use accelerated approval more liberally, it has subsequently
“revert[ed] to its cautious ways” under relentless pressure from the clinical
research community, traditional consumer groups, and some legislators. 326
In 2012, a frustrated Congress amended section 506 of the FDCA to
broaden the availability of accelerated approval and passed uncodified
“Findings” and a “Sense of Congress” encouraging the FDA to employ the
procedure more often. 327
Apart from accelerated approval, the greater attention the AIDS
movement brought to the “drug lag” contributed to a more fundamental
change that dramatically increased the speed with which the agency reviews
all drug applications. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
(“PDUFA”) established a system under which drug applicants pay user fees
to the FDA to support the IND/NDA process, while the agency commits to
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improved performance goals in the operation of this process. 328 Congress
enacted this law because of FDA complaints about budget pressures and
industry frustration with NDA backlogs, but also, as Representative Henry
Waxman emphasized, because “the public will benefit by getting access to
lifesaving drugs sooner.” 329 During hearings on PDUFA reauthorization in
1997, Jeff Bloom of the AIDS group Project Inform, appearing on behalf of
a coalition of over a hundred organizations for patients with serious and
life-threatening diseases, declared: “[T]he single most important step
Congress can take to help patients is to move quickly and revise and extend
[PDUFA].” 330 With such fervent support from patient groups, PDUFA was
renewed that year and three subsequent times at five-year intervals. 331 The
implementation of user fees has slashed the median number of months FDA
takes to review and approve NDAs for new molecular entity drugs from
23.0 months in 1993 to 9.8 months in 2012. 332
Whether the AIDS movement has helped make NDA approval easier,
as well as faster, is less clear. But the FDA now must deal with “freedom of
choice” rhetoric whenever it is reviewing the NDA for a product intended to
treat an otherwise incurable condition. And in a few prominent instances,
the patient choice argument has prevailed. For example, in response to
protests by sufferers of irritable bowel syndrome, the FDA in 2002
permitted the return to the market of Lotronex®, a drug earlier withdrawn
because of occasional severe side effects. 333 In September 2016, under
fierce pressure from patient advocates, FDA granted accelerated approval to
a treatment for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, despite the vociferous
objections of agency staffers and a negative advisory committee vote. 334
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The AIDS movement also had a significant permanent impact on the
availability of unapproved drugs. Between 2009 and 2014, the FDA cleared
more than 99 percent of the expanded access INDs and protocols it
received, for a total of nearly 6,000. 335 While impressive, this number is not
as dramatic as it might appear at first glance, however. More than 96
percent of the expanded access INDs and protocols that the FDA has
recently permitted have been for single patients. The bulk of the others have
been for “intermediate-size patient populations.” In 2013-14, for example,
the FDA cleared only 12 full-size treatment INDs and protocols. 336 A dozen
major early access programs per year far exceeds the number available prior
to the late 1980s, but it is fewer than one might expect in light of patient
demands.
The number of treatment INDs is not limited by any hesitation on the
part of the agency to permit them. To the contrary; during the same period,
the FDA received only 12 requests for such programs. 337 The true constraint
is thus a lack of industry interest in pursuing treatment INDs. But the FDA
itself plays a central role in dampening corporate participation in early
access programs through its severe restrictions on charging for unapproved
drugs.
In 2003, the cancer-focused patient advocacy group Abigail Alliance
filed a suit alleging that the FDA’s charging restrictions and its evidentiary
standard for treatment use of investigational drugs violated patients’
substantive due process rights under the 5th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The organization contended that terminally ill patients have a
right to purchase experimental therapies after the completion of phase 1
safety trials, and to do so at a price that allows manufacturers to profit from
the sale. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the
claim. 338 The current version of the FDA’s treatment IND regulations,
revised in 2009, continues to mandate that sponsors obtain agency approval
335
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before charging for investigational drugs and to limit any permitted charges
to the amount required for the recovery of direct costs. Moreover, the 2009
amendments to the rule clarified an earlier ambiguity by specifying that
recoverable direct costs do not include the expenses of research and
development. 339
The agency’s stringent charging policy is intended to preserve
sponsors’ financial incentive to complete their clinical research and apply
for NDA approval. 340 The rule’s effect—combined with other factors, such
as drug supply challenges, tort liability exposure, and the possibility that
treatment access will slow down or derail the NDA approval process—is to
reduce the pharmaceutical industry’s interest in participating in large
expanded access programs. 341 As a practical matter, therefore, the
government’s demand for data still constrains therapeutic choice in many
instances. And this situation is doubtless agreeable to TAG members, who
today describe themselves as “science-based treatment activists working to
expand and accelerate vital research ….” 342
The country’s amended “drug constitution” thus continues to reflect
TAG’s reformist approach rather than a more radical unraveling of FDA
gatekeeping power. But when TAG’s founders view the current activities
and demands of many patient activists and their libertarian and industry
allies, they must sometimes fear that when they stormed the FDA in 1988,
they, like Dr. Frankenstein, created a monster they can no longer control.
In December 2016, with the overwhelming support of both industry and
patient advocacy groups, Congress passed and President Obama signed the
21st Century Cures Act, a law intended to “accelerate the discovery,
development, and delivery of” medical products. 343 Along with providing a
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generous $4.8 billion increase in funding for the National Institutes of
Health, 344 the statute extensively amends the FDCA. Many of the law’s
FDA-related provisions reflect the spirit of AIDS activism in the late-1980s
and early-1990s. For example, 21st Century Cures requires the agency to
issue guidance regarding the use of “patient experience data” in regulatory
decisionmaking, including (“if appropriate”) their use as part of the riskbenefit assessment in drug approval. 345 It directs the agency to
programmatically evaluate and issue guidance concerning the potential use
of “real world evidence” (that is, data “from sources other than randomized
clinical trials”) to support the approval of new indications for existing
drugs. 346 The new law also requires manufacturers to publicly declare their
expanded access policies with respect to drugs for serious conditions. 347
On June 11, 2015, TAG’s Gregg Gonsalves and Mark Harrington,
along with former FDA Commissioner David Kessler, wrote an op-ed piece
for the New York Times blasting an earlier version of the legislation, which
was largely similar to the bill that later passed. Their column warned that
the law threatened to “lower the standards for approval of many medical
products” and thus undermine “the essential responsibility that drug
companies have to patients and the American public: … to show that new
drugs [are] safe and effective under the usual criteria required by the
agency.” 348 Their protests went largely unheeded, however. The 21st
Century Act ultimately passed by overwhelming margins in both the House
(392-26) and Senate (94-5).
Most of the drug provisions in the 21st Century Cures Act are soft
mandates; they encourage the agency to consider, rather require it to make,
significant changes to the drug approval process. Moreover, the law limits
the possible extent of these changes in important ways. 349 The statute is thus
a mere incremental measure compared to what is being attempted at the
state level. Since 2014, thirty-one states have enacted “right to try” laws
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/114/L
etters/251PatientGroupsSupportCures.pdf
344
Id. § 1001.This funding was an important reason why the law attracted the support
of many Democrats skeptical about its other provisions.
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348
Gregg Gonsalves Harrington Mark & David A. Kessler, Don’t Weaken the
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standard” in section 505(d) of the FDCA. § 3022.
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based on a model bill disseminated by the libertarian Goldwater Institute. 350
These statutes—which are almost certainly preempted by federal law—
essentially codify the remedy Abigail Alliance sought unsuccessfully in
court; that is, they allow physicians caring for terminal patients with no
treatment alternatives to prescribe, and companies to charge for,
unapproved drugs that have cleared phase I trials. 351
The Goldwater Institute has ties to the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC), a pro-business organization that exploits the “low policy
capacity” of busy, part-time state lawmakers by providing them with model
bills and supportive materials. 352 The proliferation of state “right to try”
laws is thus, in and of itself, a dubious measure of public enthusiasm for
such measures. In 2014, however, no less than 78.4 percent of Arizona
voters supported such a law when it was put to a statewide referendum. 353
Moreover, in September 2016 California Governor Jerry Brown, a liberal
Democrat, signed bipartisan “right to try” legislation in that state. Such
events suggest that a broad swath of Americans remains powerfully devoted
to the idea of therapeutic choice for desperately ill individuals.
Gregg Gonsalves has publicly condemned the state “right to try”
laws. 354 In a 2014 letter to the Washington Post, he explained:
Two decades ago, [AIDS activists] worked closely with the Food and Drug
Administration to streamline access to new medications, but we learned
quickly that, as patients, we needed more than access; we needed answers
about what these new drugs were doing in our bodies. Unfortunately,
350
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conservative think tanks took advantage of desperate patients to push their
own agenda—deregulation of the FDA, weakening the agency's ability to vet
new agents and give us the very answers we required.
History is repeating itself with right to try laws.

355

Gonsalves’ warning has had little if any effect, however, in slowing the
wave of state legislation.
Does the proliferation of “right to try” statutes augur a further,
dramatic liberalizing of the country’s federal “drug constitution”? A truer
test will occur as Congress considers federal “right to try” legislation. 356
Unlike the preempted state laws, a federal statute—depending on how it is
framed—could have immense practical implications. President Donald
Trump and Vice President Mike Pence have expressed support for such a
law. 357 Following the opening of the 115th Congress in January 2017, “right
to try” bills were quickly introduced in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. 358 These bills are ambiguous with respect to
manufacturers’ authority to charge for experimental treatments. The success
and details of any federal “right to try” law will hinge largely on American
citizens’ awareness of the destructive effect that the sale of unapproved
drugs could have on the clinical research enterprise. 360 Americans value
their medical freedom, but they presumably value the advance of medical
knowledge, as well. They might be willing to curb the former to extent
necessary to ensure the latter. But perhaps not. The very fact that this is a
close question is another legacy of the AIDS movement of the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
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